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This thesis explores the effect of King James VI and I on the English sense of 
national self from 1603 through 1612.  It suggests that the debate regarding union 
between Scotland and England heightened the English sense of nationhood.  Parliament’s 
rejection of an Anglo-Scottish union constituted a response to both James’ Scottish 
nationality and his vision of England and Scotland as equal partners within a British 
union, notions that ran counter to parliamentary expectations of English hegemony within 
the British Isles.  In effect, James threatened the notion that the English held of 
themselves as an elect people.  Ultimately, this study argues that James’ reign was a 
fulcrum that pushed the English to re-evaluate their place within the British Isles.  
Although political elites re-affirmed the primacy of English cultural and political 
dominance in the region, many English rejected a more expansive alternate identity in the 
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 “We feel not one, we see not the other.”1  So spoke members of the English 
Committee for the Union in the House of Commons in 1604, expressing sentiments that 
ultimately blocked King James VI and I’s drive for union. In the midst of the first 
Westminster debate concerning the king’s objective to unify Scotland and England, the 
committee released its highly sceptical findings to the Commons.  Impatient with its 
progress in the House of Commons, James decided it best to proclaim himself King of 
Great Britain, thereby forcing the creation of the British state.  As ambiguous as the 
Committee’s quip might read, their brief sentence encapsulated the English conundrum.  
At the heart of the union debate, many of the English elite in London could not foresee a 
united Britain that was not manifestly English.  To be British was fine, so long as it 
equated to English.  Without realizing it, the Committee defined an early modern English 
national consciousness in the early Jacobean age.  Ambiguous and exclusive, it closed in 
on itself for many observers as they turned away from a growing inclination towards 
Britishness.    
 England and Scotland eventually entered an incorporating union in 1707, but the 
efforts to unify the two countries into one realm became a serious prospect more than a 
century before with the elevation of the Scottish King James VI to the English throne in 
1603.2  James VI and I famously enjoyed a warm reception upon his arrival in London, 
                                                          
1Journal of the House of Commons (April 25, 1604): I: 184-185. [Hereafter CJ] 
2 Elizabeth never officially named an heir. On her deathbed, she was asked to approve James VI of 
Scotland as her successor whereupon the dying queen, unable to speak, lifted her hand to her head. 
According to Robert Cary’s eye-witness account, those present took her gesture as a sign of approval. See 
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but his English parliamentarians greeted his desire for a political union between Scotland 
and England with strong opposition.  For the Stuart monarch, a union of the two 
kingdoms was simply self-evident, the logical epilogue to the union of the crowns upon 
his assumption of rule in both kingdoms.  Similar in language and Protestant affinities, 
and sharing one island, England and Scotland were united in his person; a parliamentary 
union would make his two kingdoms indivisible and ensure a peace that had for so long 
eluded their historical relationship. To maintain the division between the two countries 
was to divide James himself.  Indeed, union was God’s will.3  Yet, despite the efforts of 
the king, he could expect little more than the regnal union that the English members of 
Parliament would allow.  Rejecting a full union of England and Scotland, the House of 
Commons would only countenance the legal easing of discriminatory laws against Scots 
in England, liberalizing laws governing trade between the two kingdoms, and citizenship 
rights for so-called Scottish post-nati.  From the start of James’ reign in England until his 
death in 1625, his dream of a full political union remained elusive.4     
 This analysis seeks to determine the state of the English sense of national 
belonging in the early modern period, in particular during the early years of James’ reign 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Robert Cary, Memoirs of the Life of Robert Cary (London, 1759), 176; Carole Levin, The Heart and 
Stomach of a King: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2013), 168. However, the accession of James to the English throne came not from a spontaneous 
decision made moments before the queen’s death. Rather, James became the king of England following a 
two-year correspondence between himself and Sir Robert Cecil and other English counsellors kept secret 
from Elizabeth. See John Bruce, ed., Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil 
and Others in England During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth with an Appendix Containing Papers 
Illustrative of Transactions Between King James and Robert Earl of Essex (Camden Society, 1861).   
3 James VI and I, “By the King. A Proclamation concerning the Kings Majesties Stile, of King of Great 
Britaine,” October 20, 1604, in Stuart Royal Proclamations, vol. I, Royal Proclamations of King James I, 
1603-1625, ed. James F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 94-95; James VI and 
I, “By the King. A Proclamation for the uniting of England and Scotland,” in Larkin and Hughes, 18-19; 
James I, Entry Speech, in Somers Tracts, ed. Walter Scott. Vol. xi. (London, 1809), 62; Alan Stewart, The 
Cradle King: A Life of James VI and I (London: Chatto & Windus, 2003): 209-10. 
4 Jenny Wormald, “The Union of 1603,” in Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union 
1603, ed., Roger A. Mason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17-40. 
3 
 
in England, in from 1603 until 1612.  For practical reasons, this timeframe must remain 
narrow, for the object of this study is to ascertain the political, and, to a lesser degree, 
cultural response of the English to a Scottish monarch and to observe the effect of James’ 
nationality and efforts to create a unitary state on English notions of themselves as a 
unique people.  The earliest year of this study, 1603, marks the start of the Stuart king’s 
tenure as English monarch, and with his accession, the start of his diplomatic efforts to 
attach Scotland to the English state.  The latter year, 1612, marks what one historian has 
called the definitive end of those endeavours, by which time “the union project” was 
dead.5   As such, this thesis seeks to answer the following question:  Did the accession of 
a Scottish king alter English sentiment about themselves as a people?  If so, how and 
why?   This study proffers an analysis of the consequences of James’ reign on English 
national identity as expressed or understood by vocal members of the country’s ruling 
elite.  While it attempts to recapture the shared assumptions of the wider population, a 
comprehensive analysis obviously lies beyond the reach of a single study. 
 This investigation focuses primarily on the English response to their Scottish king 
and the effect of his desire for union on the national sense of self.  As the union debate 
played such a significant role in the first few years of his reign, that controversy provides 
the main avenue for an exploration of the topic.  An examination of the relationship 
between James’ representation of Britishness and the political will to preserve 
Englishness will provide an effective vehicle by which the significance of the complex 
interplay between these competing national identities can be understood.  Although 
Scotophobia informed the response of many Westminster MPs and is well documented in 
                                                          
5 Jenny Wormald, “James VI and I: Two Kings or One?” History 68 (1983): 207.     
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their speeches and in the literary record of the period, this thesis does not consider the 
ethnic dimension of the sense of national English belonging, nor does it seek to interpret 
the religious underpinnings of English identity in the early sixteenth century.  Although 
numerous English men and women of this period identified with the Catholic faith, this 
study presumes that Protestantism increasingly formed the foundation of the English 
understanding of Britain and Britishness.6  With the exception of the Gunpowder Plot, 
which arguably solidified Protestantism’s lock on the English conception of the national 
sense of belonging, religion played no significant role in the union debate’s effect on 
Englishness.  Rather, it was the potential threat that union posed to English culture and 
tradition that changed the national sense of self.          
A discussion of national identity requires definition of those concepts.  However, 
several theoretical schools of thought offer differing, and at times contrasting, hypotheses 
to explain the origins of national consciousness within the Western European tradition in 
general and England in particular.7  Indeed, scholars have long debated the meaning of 
national consciousness, and adherents of the modernist school of thought dispute the 
existence of such a national awareness as early as the start of James’ reign in England.8  
This present study cannot provide the definitive last word on the existence of a national 
                                                          
6 Alan MacColl, “The Construction of England as a Protestant ‘British’ Nation in the Sixteenth Century,” 
Renaissance Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2004): 608.  Protestantism becomes a “bedrock of common 
Britishness” in the eighteenth century.  See Colin Kidd, “Protestantism, constitutionalism and British 
Identity under the later Stuarts,” in British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, edited by 
Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 338-339.  See also 
Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1992). 
7 For a comprehensive overview of the disparate schools of thought regarding national consciousness and 
the scholars relevant to each, see Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
8 According to the modernist paradigm, nationalism did not appear in Western Europe and America until 
the mid-eighteenth century. Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 1. For another modernist perspective, see also Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983, 2006).   
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sense of self in early seventeenth-century England.  It takes, however, as its starting point 
the assumption that many members of the English population, including the ruling elites 
at Westminster, possessed an awareness of themselves as a people with a common 
purpose.  To those ends, this thesis will offer glimpses of that national self-awareness 
that, taken together, will attempt to provide one interpretation of the effect of James’ 
kingship on English national sentiment.  
For scholars of the modern era, national consciousness usually denotes the simple 
awareness of the existence of a distinct cultural and linguistic entity of which one is a 
part.  National identity includes the cultural markers that one associates with a nation.  A 
nation-state is the political expression of that nation, a people who share cultural and 
linguistic attributes distinct from other peoples and which help engender a national 
consciousness among that population.  Nationalism is the outward, often political, 
expression of one’s national consciousness. Scholars debate the definitions of each of 
these terms, and clearly the outward signs of national consciousness, national identity, 
and nationalism overlap with one another to a degree that they functionally reveal the 
same regard for country.9  In early modern England such uniform expressions or 
                                                          
9 Modernists reject the idea of “ancient or immemorial” nations and disallow the argument that they are 
“givens.” For the modernist, nations are recent constructs, and as such, recently founded nationalism cannot 
be applied “into earlier, pre-modern collectivities and sentiments.” In other words, “retrospective 
nationalism” proves inherently dishonest in its rendition of ancestral antecedents whose mores in the 
ancient and medieval periods were far different from that of today. Finally, modernists contend that nations 
stem not from organic, evolutionary processes originating in the historical past, but rather from relatively 
recent, rational, planned “historical impulses.” See Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 18-19. Unlike 
modernists, Liah Greenfeld argued that the English experience with nationalism falls within an ethno-
symbolist framework, finding evidence of national consciousness in the early sixteenth century. Adherents 
to the ethno-symbolist paradigm of nationalism reject the modernist emphasis on nations as recent entities, 
claiming that evidence exists of a pre-modern national awareness in Western Europe. See Liah Greenfeld, 
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
Benedict Anderson doubted the validity of nation and nationalism, for he believed the former depends on 
“subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists” who lack historical training to realize that the nation is a 
modern invention. Concurrently, Anderson contended that nationalism proves inherently ambiguous and 
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understandings of identity were rare, and even where they existed the evidence proves 
insufficient to apply them to residents of every city, town and region.  Nevertheless, 
certain groupings of people, such as the MPs at Westminster, appear to have shared a 
sense of national identity and certain sources with a broad popular appeal, such as ballads 
and plays, offer glimpses of national sentiment and attitudes towards the people of other 
nations. This analysis seeks to recapture these senses of identity and to observe the effect 
that James and his drive for union had on senses of the national self.   
The argument that this thesis makes, that James’ English kingship prompted the 
many members of the London-based ruling and social elite to become less British in 
outlook, rests on two types of source material.  As much of the debate surrounding union 
occurred in the House of Commons, parliamentary records substantiate much of this 
investigation.  Yet the possible union with Scotland worked its way into the literary 
works of the time, reflecting the significance of the debate to a broad swath of the 
English people.  Members of all socio-economic strata read or listened to ballads, verse, 
and drama.10  The profit motive alone suggests a record that reflected its readership and 
audience.  Along with ballads and non-literary sources, this study treats several literary 
works including the drama of William Shakespeare as historical artefacts to allow 
analysis of contemporary public discourse.  Richard II, Macbeth, and Henry VIII seem 
the most apt in providing a feel for the public’s response to the Scottish king, his efforts, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that the nation remains nothing more than imaginary. Although its citizens think the nation well-defined 
and of limited scope, they will never know each other in toto, and thus, the bonds that link them prove 
fantasy, arguing that “in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” See Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities (London: Verso, [1991] 2006), 5-6. 
10 Matthew Dimmock and Andrew Hadfield, introduction to Literature and Popular Culture in Early 
Modern England, ed., Matthew Dimmock and Andrew Hadfield (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2009), 6-7; Pauline Croft, “Libels, Popular Literacy and Public Opinion in Early Modern 
England,” Historical Research 68, no. 167 (October 1995): 266-285. 
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and the Scots, all of which give definition to the national English sense of self.  Richard 
II, Macbeth, and Henry VIII show the trajectory of English sentiment regarding how men 
and women saw themselves as a people.  Written towards the end of the Elizabethan era, 
Richard II suggests a time when the English monarch was perceived as one and the same 
as the country.  As a telling contrast, Henry VIII, written nine years into James’ reign, 
indicates an era when the monarch no longer represented Englishness.  Additionally, 
Macbeth reveals that some members of the London population, including some 
Westminster MPs, regarded themselves as more civilized than the Scots.  Active in the 
world of theatre and drama until his retirement in 1613, Shakespeare’s body of work 
reflects the ethos of his era.11  As a national sense of belonging often find expression in 
overt public display, theatre reveals a current of discourse that involved the public.   
Shakespeare was the focus of royal and aristocratic patronage; powerful members 
of the court and society supported his dramatic efforts, and as such, the playwright took 
an active part in the political and public discourse of the late Tudor and early Stuart 
periods.  Like ballads and other literary sources, Shakespeare’s work also reflects the 
state of the country’s sense of self.12  Some would argue that Renaissance writers 
presented an idealized vision of the nation that brought together crown, church, and land 
– three components that determined a person’s status as English or non-English.13  While 
such images arguably reflect an era’s popular sentiment and thus provide definition to 
expectations of national identity, research can corroborate the veracity of such sources. 
                                                          
11 Lois Potter, The Life of William Shakespeare: A Critical Biography (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 
401-403. 
12 Robert S. Babcock, “‘For I am Welsh, You Know’: Henry V, Fluellen, and the Place of Wales in the 
Sixteenth-Century English Nation,” in In Laudem Caroli for Charles G. Nauert, ed., James V. Mehl 
(Kirksville, Missouri:  Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1998), 190.   
13 Claire McEachern, The Poetics of English Nationhood, 1590-1612 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 4.  
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Admittedly, Shakespeare, like other early modern literary figures, wrote to entertain, but 
dramatic work frequently included polemical messages conveyed with much 
circumspection.  Recognizing such political discourse leads to an understanding of the 
limitations that curtailed public expression and reading against the grain can uncover 
English societal norms of the early modern period.14  Shakespeare wrote plays that not 
only caught the attention of members of various socio-economic strata in early modern 
England, but also bridged social divisions, literally bringing people of different walks of 
life into one theatre.  In doing so, the playwright, like other literary figures and the 
anonymous authors of ballads, left a record of national sympathies and antipathies that, 
taken together, go a long way to define Englishness in early seventeenth-century 
England, the time of James’ accession to the English throne.         
 Although historians have traditionally eschewed literary sources as eye-witness 
accounts of past events, they often rely on them as evidence of popular politics and 
political culture or to gain a sense of the attitudes of the composers of those works and 
the people who shared them; unlike conventional archival artefacts, literary texts often 
provide insight into the interplay between popular and elite culture, and representations 
of gender, sexuality and social standing.  Elizabeth Foyster has suggested that historians 
should be more open to trusting literary sources.  She contended that literary scholars 
have managed, through the rigorous application of methods of textual analysis, to 
diminish or even dissolve the qualitative “differences between ‘factual’ history and 
                                                          
14 Donna Hamilton, Shakespeare and the Politics of Protestant England (Lexington, Kentucky: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1992), x. 
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‘fictional’ literature.”15  Seen from this perspective, legal depositions and fiction are 
disparate forms of narrative discourse.  Foyster maintained that literary works mark 
“historical events which had a material existence” and through careful literary criticism, 
they, along with other forms of written texts, can and should play a much more 
significant role in the research that historians conduct.16  Literary scholars have naturally 
made great use of literary works, treating them and their representations of Englishness – 
or Britishness – as the sort of primary sources that Foyster suggested.  They have 
arguably taken the lead in the past few years in exploring the meaning of national identity 
in pre-modern England.  Their published work helps produce a more comprehensive 
picture of the interaction between nation and individual.  
 James’ kingship influenced the way many English men and women saw 
themselves as a national community.  Many sixteenth-century English appear to have felt 
a sense of national belonging, and for most, the basis of this national identity lay in their 
common political, economic, legal, and religious uniformity.  That the monarch acted as 
the Supreme Head – or Supreme Governor in Elizabeth I’s case – of the national church, 
allowed the Tudors to garner religious and dynastic loyalty and encouraged a sense of 
national difference.  England shared only one land border with another country, unlike 
most European countries, and that isolation reinforced the idea of living in a national 
                                                          
15 Elizabeth A. Foyster, Manhood in Early Modern England: Honour, Sex and Marriage (London and New 
York: Longman, 1999), 14-15.  Like Foyster, Andrew Hadfield found historical relevance in literary 
sources.  He maintained that sixteenth-century literature disseminated socio-cultural and political ideas, and 
as such worked as an “ideological cement” that “helped constitute the nation.” As part of their literary 
efforts, “most writers elided the distinction between Britain and England” with the consequence of 
“asserting an English hegemony within Britain, colonising the imagined space as English.”  See Andrew 
Hadfield, Literature, Politics and National Identity: Reformation to Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, [1994] 2009), 8-11. 
16 Foyster, Manhood in Early Modern England, 14-15. 
10 
 
community that was distant and distinct.17  Free trade within England and mercantilist 
practices abroad fostered an insularity that in turn kindled an awareness of a people with 
common objectives.  These elements of national identity combined with the unifying 
power of a common culture, language, and flourishing literary canon.18  Yet Englishness 
also gained strength from the idea of existing in opposition to external forces.  There is 
little doubt that the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 helped seal a sense that the 
English were not simply a people apart but God’s chosen on earth.19  Although the Welsh 
had not completely assimilated into the broader English population thereby ensuring its 
ethnic diversity, the break with Rome gave the English reason to believe themselves 
unique.  To this, Brian Levack noted that the impression of being an elect nation, which 
he argued began with Thomas Rogers, Anthony Marten, Thomas Brightman, and John 
Milton – more so than John Foxe, further undergirded the sense of a unique people.20   
 Despite hints of an English national sense of belonging in the Tudor period, the 
dimensions of that identity proved, broadly speaking, British.  The origins of that 
Britishness lay largely with two medieval tracts.  In a highly influential description with 
lasting effect, Bede described England as nearly separated from Scotland by “two inlets 
of the sea” (i.e., the Firths of Forth and Clyde), thereby rendering “the British part of 
Britain” (i.e., England) a quasi-island, territory that belonged to the Britons.  To the north 
                                                          
17 Brian Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the Union, 1603-1707 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 174-76; Greenfeld contends by the 1530s “nation” first came to signify 
“people,” suggesting a national self awareness among the English some seventy years before James VI 
acceded the country’s throne. See Greenfeld, Nationalism, 30.  For a discussion of Elizabeth’s role as 
Supreme Governor of the Church of England, see Levin, The Heart and Stomach of a King, 14-15. 
18 Levack, The Formation of the British State, 175-176. 
19 K.J. Kesselring, “‘Berwick is Our England’: Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border 
Town,” in Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England, ed., Norman L. Jones and Daniel 
Woolf (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 92-112; Levack, The Formation of the British State, 21. 
20 Levack, Ibid., 172-73. 
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in Scotland lived two “savage nations,” the Scots and Picts.21  That Bede’s Britons were 
the ancestors of the Welsh was rather conveniently forgotten thanks to a later tract that 
ensured that the Germanic forbears of the English populated ancient Britain, a narrative 
that allowed subsequent generations of English to live secure in the notion that they were 
the rightful Britons.  Completed in 1136, Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia regum 
Britanniae with its Brute myth suggested that England was properly the most dominant 
country in Britain.  While Monmouth’s history provided the framework for English 
hegemony, Henry Tudor’s Welsh ancestry promulgated the idea that the English were the 
rightful heirs of the island’s British pedigree.  To ensure English domination over the 
whole of Britain in the early sixteenth century, his son, Henry VIII, famously tried to 
force Scotland’s James V to agree to a betrothal between his infant daughter, the future 
Mary, Queen of Scots, and Henry’s five-year-old son, Edward.  The Tudor king 
eventually resorted to military aggression, an episode now known as the Rough Wooing; 
more significant was his attempt to establish an English suzerainty over the Scots, a claim 
he based on a rather dubious assertion that a long line of Scottish kings had paid homage 
to their counterparts on the English throne.22  In a similar vein, Elizabeth I thought 
herself superior to James VI and was often annoyed when he ignored her wishes.  Armed 
with an age-old presumption grounded in pseudo-history, the English held themselves 
above their Scottish neighbours, with the implication that they, the English, had the 
                                                          
21 Bede, Bede's Ecclesiastical History of England [The Ecclesiastical History of the English People] 
(731AD), ed. A.M. Sellar (London: George Bell and Sons, 1907), 23-24; Alan MacColl, “The Meaning of 
‘Britain’ in Medieval and Early Modern England,” Journal of British Studies 45, no. 2 (April 2006): 250-
51, 259-60.  
22 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2000), 34-38; 
Elizabeth A. Bonner, “The Genesis of Henry VIII’s ‘Rough Wooing’ of the Scots,” Northern History 33, 
no. 1 (1997): 36-53; Roger A. Mason, “Scotching the Brut: Politics, History, and National Myth in 
Sixteenth-Century Britain,” in Scotland and England, 1286-1815, ed. Roger A. Mason (Edinburgh: John 
Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1987), 67.  
12 
 
rightful claim to the whole of Britain.23  Geopolitically, the English perspective was 
British, even if they never used that moniker to label their national identity.   
 Confirmation of this British outlook appears in literary sources.  In his Acts and 
Monuments (1570), John Foxe revealed an implied Britishness when he included such 
phrases as “this our country England and Scotland.”  His narrative tells of martyrs 
including the Scots Patrick Hamilton and George Wishart who burned north of the border 
for their Protestantism.24  Gaining an understanding of that national identity provides a 
measure of the change that occurred during James’ reign, and the literary record has 
preserved evidence of the era’s definition of national belonging.  Philip Schwyzer 
contended that this national consciousness found expression in Shakespeare’s 
Elizabethan plays.  Yet Schwyzer believed that the national identity in question was 
British “in content and character” rather than English.25  As evidence of a sense of 
Britishness, Schwyzer pointed to the speech of Shakespeare’s John of Gaunt in Richard 
II, maintaining that the character’s famous soliloquy depicts Britain, not England: “this 
scept’red isle … This precious stone set in the silver sea.”26  In this passage, Gaunt has 
most obviously forgotten Scotland and Wales as he speaks of the whole island of Britain.  
                                                          
23 Roger A. Mason, “Scotland, Elizabethan England and the Idea of Britain,” Transactions of the RHS 14 
(2004): 288; Jenny Wormald, “James VI and I: Two Kings or One?” History 68 (1983): 189. 
24 John Foxe, The Ecclesiasticall Historie: Containing the Acts and Monuments of Martyrs … And divers 
other things incident to the Realme of England and Scotland …, vol. 1 (London, 1576), sig. A1r, Early 
English Books Online [Hereafter EEBO] (Accessed January 18, 2018).    
25 Philip Schwyzer, Literature, Nationalism, and Memory in Early Modern England and Wales 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3-4.  
26 William Shakespeare, Richard II, II.i.40 & 46 quoted in Schwyzer, Literature, Nationalism, and 
Memory, 4; Alan MacColl traced the reference to the “scept’red isle” to Bede’s claim that England 
extended as far north as the Firths of Forth and Clyde, the point at which “two islets of the sea” nearly 
bisected the British landmass. Everything to the north, Bede called “Scocia ultra marina,” or Scotland over 
the water. The territory to the south, Bede called Britain. MacColl credited Bede for generating the idea of 
a “restricted” Britain wholly within the English realm, thereby giving the English the sole claim to the 
appellation of “Britons.” Therewith also lay the idea of England as an island, or “scept’red isle.” See Alan 
MacColl, “The Meaning of ‘Britain’ in Medieval and Early Modern England,” Journal of British Studies 
45, no. 2 (April 2006): 250-51, 259-60. 
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Schwyzer argued that Shakespeare’s lines reveal an inherently insular national identity, 
but by his reckoning, it is by necessity British, not English – the “topographical slippage” 
a sign of the outward-looking, expansive sense of belonging.  He further contended that 
when Gaunt celebrates England as a “royal throne of kings,” he references Britain, for 
only in the pre-Anglo-Saxon era was Britain ever thought to have been ruled by one king.  
Schwyzer found another indication that the Tudors were British, rather than English, in 
Shakespeare’s own era, for members of the dynasty claimed a direct ancestral line to the 
Welsh, the early modern ancestors of the ancient Britons, a people with an actual 
indigenous claim to the land.27  By the end of Elizabeth’s reign, commentators had 
largely discredited the veracity of the Brute myth as genuine history.  However, by then, 
Monmouth’s story had passed into the English poetic canon where it could escape 
meaningful criticism and exist metaphorically for generations,28 providing the sort of 
imaginative national bonds that for Benedict Anderson proved fantasy.29  While it was 
likely just a vocal minority who were overtly patriotic in the latter half of the sixteenth 
century, the English political and literary disposition proved inherently British in 
imagination, even if not in their usual articulations of national identity.  
 In conducting research into the effect of James’ reign on English national 
sentiment, I drew from several historiographies. These areas of scholarly research 
provide various approaches to the topic of the early modern English sense of national 
self; however, relying on such a myriad collection of scholars, academic fields, and 
primary source materials underscores the complexity of tracing the ramifications of a 
                                                          
27 Schwyzer, Literature, Nationalism, and Memory, 3-5. 
28 MacColl, “The Construction of England as a Protestant ‘British’ Nation in the Sixteenth Century,” 604. 
29 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
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Scottish king and his union project on the way segments of the London population came 
to see themselves within Britain.  Along with the work already mentioned in this 
introduction, this study brings together research from various other, often overlapping, 
scholarly fields.    
The question of succession in late Elizabethan England has prompted much 
research into the queen’s refusal to name her successor.  Indeed, Elizabeth’s refusal to 
marry, produce children, and select an heir left the crown open to several would-be 
monarchs.  Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes noted that by the 1590s, James VI was not 
the only claimant to the English throne.  They maintain that sixteen rivals, including the 
king of Scotland could have plausibly become the next monarch upon the queen’s 
death.30  Alexander Courtney argued that the support of English noblemen pushed James 
to the head of the line.  Once James took advantage of their interest, his correspondence 
with several of them became his best strategy for securing the throne.  Of his contacts in 
England, Courtney maintained that the support of Sir Robert Cecil proved the most 
significant, for James needed his help after acceding the throne.31  Janet Dickinson 
argued that James’ anxiety about the question of succession drove him to strike up a 
correspondence with Essex several years before the Scottish king began writing letters to 
Cecil.  While the earl fell victim to his own ambition, he was a leading figure at court, 
and James’ connection to him reveals the king’s desire for the English crown and his 
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insecurity about inheriting it.32  In his examination of Elizabeth and the succession, 
Simon Adams argues that of the Tudor queen’s contemporaries, Mary Stuart was the one 
descendent of Henry VII whose claim to the throne remained untainted.  As such, James 
VI’s claim proved clear enough to lead Elizabeth to propose raising and educating the 
young king in the English court to better integrate him into the English royal dynasty.  
Adams’ research indicates that while James’ accession to the English throne remained 
relatively uncertain, it was by no means a surprise.33  All told, despite Elizabeth’s refusal 
to name her successor, a vibrant effort to secure the monarchy after her decease 
flourished, indicating subjects who looked to the monarchy as a potential source of 
stability and saw themselves as its caretakers.  
Much of this thesis attempts to capture a sense of the evolving nature of the 
national sentiment of a people responding to a king from a foreign country.  
Developments nearly contemporaneous with Shakespeare’s active career indicate a 
slowly evolving conceptualization of nation.  Part of that evolution relied on the ability of 
the English people to envision a country of their own, in effect, to recognize a specific 
territory as the geographical expression of their cultural and linguistic particularities.  
Literary historian Richard Helgerson examined the perception of nation that various 
literary figures put forth in their work, looking particularly closely at representations of 
the collective sense of nation that the English language provided.  In most references to 
England, Helgerson found a current of “intense national self-consciousness,” often linked 
to the monarch but also to “the nobility, the law, the land, the economy, the common 
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people, the church” all part of the “fundamental source of national identity.”34  He limited 
his study to tracing the sense of Englishness within the literature of Renaissance literary 
figures.  Schwyzer, by contrast, expanded the notion of Englishness, arguing that national 
consciousness in Tudor England was more British than English in construct and practice.  
He built on earlier historians who argued that Englishness was “a relational identity, a 
matter of complex and often bitter negotiation among the nations of the Atlantic 
archipelago”35 with the implication that “British” would put the English and Scots 
together into one national category, suggesting similarity rather than difference.  
Schwyzer further contended that English writers of the era played an instrumental part in 
shaping their country’s sense of national identity, a process that often necessitated the 
artful closing of gaps between non-English ancestors and contemporaneous reality.36   
Though many Westminster MPs proved overtly anti-Scot, when it came to union 
with the northern kingdom, it was the possible loss of ostensibly ancient English customs 
that alarmed so many of them.  In a highly theoretical treatise, Colin Kidd studied the 
significance of ethnic identity in the early modern British world.  He sought to place 
ethnic identification within the hierarchy of church, monarchy, constitution, and locality, 
looking specifically at the “value systems of the intellectual elites – lay and clerical – 
who shaped and articulated the public identities of the British political nations.”37  
Despite his concession that xenophobia formed an underlying basis for the response of 
seventeenth-century popular culture in Britain, Kidd contended that such phobic 
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responses within elite political discourse proved nuanced and thus far more difficult to 
discern.38  Kidd concluded that while ethnic consciousness played a relatively minor role 
in early seventeenth-century political thinking, pedigree was paramount.  He argued that 
“provenance was the keystone of legitimacy, whether Biblical, confessional, or 
institutional.”39  Lineage, and its historical depths, determined legitimacy and shaped 
political debates concerning constitutions, conquest, and its resulting union, and finally, 
regnal status within composite states.  Ultimately, Kidd determined that while ethnicity 
mattered in the early modern British world, political elites found the concern with 
“prescriptive legitimacy of institutions” of far greater import.40  In effect, Kidd created a 
national paradigm whereby the longevity of cultural and political traditions did more to 
shape national consciousness than did ethnic identity.   
 English national sentiment rested on the seemingly self-evident notion of 
England’s leading role in the British Isles.  Steven Ellis explored the early modern 
English inability to fathom England as anything other than a hegemonic power in Britain 
and Ireland.  For the English parliamentarians, the concept of bringing the two kingdoms 
together on an equal footing to create one country was simply inconceivable.  At the 
time, Wales and Ireland exemplified the possible options for creating a political 
relationship with Scotland.  Either the English could rule Scotland as they did Ireland, as 
a dependency governed by Westminster, or they could annex Scotland as they had Wales. 
No other model appeared possible, given that since 1296 the English had made repeated 
efforts to reduce Scotland to an English dominion.  On that count, the Scots could only be 
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subordinate partners to the English who considered the Scots as lacking in civility and 
thus as primitive as they considered the Welsh and Irish to be.41         
  J.G.A. Pocock explored the theoretical foundation of James’ perspective of his 
place in Britain.  In particular, Pocock considered the king’s view of himself as “a head to 
its body or a husband to his wife,” an aspect of the political theory of the so-called King’s 
Two Bodies.42  Yet, including Ireland, James reigned over three kingdoms, a problematic 
connection, for, as Pocock emphasized, he could never rule over a Catholic population, 
annexed to England and thus subordinate.43  Pocock laid the blame for James’ failure to 
unite Scotland and England at the foot of English elites who feared that such a union 
would mean certain loss of the common law and thus their “distinctive existence.”  A 
united kingdom would bring the destruction of their “ancient constitution,” their 
perception of themselves as an independent people.44  Here, therefore, is a story of a 
people who jealously guarded their traditions, but Pocock gave no indication that the 
English changed because of the threat they perceived. 
 Historian Steve Murdoch traced the development of national identities in Britain, 
calling into question the widely held assumption that the early modern Scots and English 
rejected a British identity.  As part of his analysis, Murdoch examined the Union of the 
Crowns and James’ attempt to fashion a British monarchy and with it, a British 
diplomatic corps, navy, military, and Union Flag.  Murdoch contended that during the 
debate regarding political union between Scotland and England, some Scots referred to 
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themselves as Scoto-Britons, and continued to do so even after the possibility for union 
ended.  Evidence also suggests that some English, like their Scottish counterparts, 
identified as Anglo-British, Scotophobic outbursts at Westminster notwithstanding.  
Murdoch argued that the idea of a British identity was not unheard of on both sides of the 
border, if not widespread, and suggested several historical events that appear to have 
prompted a desire by some to assume a greater British identity.45  
The debate surrounding James and the proposed Anglo-Scottish union has 
prompted considerable research over the years.  The historiography of the Anglo-Scottish 
union provides much of the secondary source material for this study.  Though English 
MPs appear to have been content with the Union of the Crowns, their Scottish king was 
not.  Evidence suggests that James misunderstood English expectations of union which in 
turn undermined his efforts to create a full political union between England and Scotland.  
For many of the English, a so-called perfect union meant English political domination, an 
arrangement exemplified by the relationships with the Welsh and Irish, a result only 
achievable through conquest, a prospect unpalatable to James and his fellow Scots.  
James’ desire for a union of equal partners had no precedent in English history and 
alarmed national sensibilities.46  Wallace Notestein’s seminal The House of Commons, 
1604-1610 provides context and detail for the parliamentary debates that emerged out of 
the topic of union.47  Jenny Wormald published a number of articles on James’ English 
kingship and his desire for union, contending that James was a successful king 
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specifically because of his refusal to become English.  In effect, he remained more James 
VI than James I, and his Scottishness allowed him to navigate the vagaries of English 
socio-cultural, political, and religious conflicts that plagued the reigns of Elizabeth I and 
Charles I.  Wormald suggested that the regnal union could only take place “under a 
Scottish king.”48  Yet, arguably, the king’s Scottishness thwarted his own efforts for a full 
political union between the two kingdoms.  In his 1975 “British History:  A Plea for a 
New Subject,” Pocock argued that the various national identities of Britain and Ireland 
are mutually constitutive, and thus, historians must take that influence into account to 
produce meaningful analyses of the formation of the individual national identities of 
England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.49  Indeed, James’ kingship would appear to 
substantiate Pocock’s argument.  A number of historians have followed Pocock’s lead 
and investigated James’ influence on religion, finance, governance, and the desire for an 
incorporating union.  However, their focus on the controversies surrounding his efforts to 
create a united kingdom of Great Britain has precluded any attempt to connect his efforts 
to English national sentiment or identity.  Conrad Russell, for example, examined the 
outrage inspired by the king’s use of the appellation of Great Britain in place of England.  
Yet he stopped short of investigating the underlying causes for such anger other than 
attributing it to insecurity on the part of Westminster parliamentarians.  Furthermore, he 
did not attempt to ascertain the possible effect of the king’s reign on English national 
identity.  There is talk of a possible nascent British identity with James’ proclamation of 
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himself as King of Great Britain, but a direct link between James’ accession to the 
English throne and the national English sense of self remains unexplored.50  
 In The Union of England and Scotland, Bruce Galloway often refutes Notestein’s 
conclusions while providing a foundational work on the topic of a proposed Anglo-
Scottish union.  Galloway researched the first five years of James’ reign in England, 
looking closely at the proposed treaty of union and the debates in Westminster that took 
place because of it.  As English MPs considered the possible ramifications of a political 
union on the legal, religious, economic, and constitutional infrastructures of England,51 
Galloway drew the conclusion that the proposed Anglo-Scottish union faced 
insurmountable hostility in the Commons, ultimately killing it.52  Although Galloway’s 
work provides a comprehensive assessment of the political theories, concerns, and 
complications that shaped the union debate, he made no attempt to study the 
ramifications of the years-long controversy on English identity.  
  Literary scholars have played a leading role in the last few years in assessing 
early modern works for hints of national belonging.  Claire McEachern connected Henry 
VIII’s Acts of Appeals (1533) that proclaimed England an empire to the literary works of 
Renaissance writers including Shakespeare.53  Specifically, McEachern investigated the 
way in which Henry’s statement prompted writers like Shakespeare to create an idealized 
vision of nation that brought together crown, church, and land – three components that 
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determined one’s status as English or non-English.54  Thus, these three co-determinants 
produced an evolving ideal of belonging that transcended hierarchies and slowly 
supplanted the idea of a realm based on monarchical direction,55 a conclusion arguably 
confirmed by the MPs’ response to James’ desire for union.  Moreover, she argued that 
the meaning of nation was not necessarily static and unyielding:   
In the early Tudor period, nation more often means race, or king – the kith and kin 
of a common nativity, or birth, natio. Yet it also hovers near the meaning we have 
given it, and in the course of the sixteenth century it comes to denote that 
principle of political self-determination belonging to a people linked (if in nothing 
else) by a common government.56 
 
According to McEachern’s rationale, English MPs would have felt insecure at the 
thought of sharing their political institutions with the Scots, a people beyond the scope of 
the English sense of belonging.   
 Although Shakespeare’s Henry V predates James’ accession to the English throne 
by several years, the play hints at the contours of English identity prior to the Stuart 
king’s accession.  Philip Seargeant examined Henry V, looking for the manner with 
which its language conveys an emergent sense of national consciousness.  Seargent 
argued that language as an organizing principle cannot always withstand common 
purpose:  “National identity is always differently organized, yet such categories are of 
questionable validity when people re-organize themselves in terms of a common 
purpose.”57  In particular, Seargeant studied the form and function of the play’s language, 
finding patterns that indicate a national consciousness; however, he argued that the 
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language does not overtly celebrate English nationhood.  Rather, the speech itself 
dominates certain non-English characters.  Seargeant’s article provides more evidence of 
an Elizabethan national identity that rested on the ideal of English primacy in the British 
Isles.58   
 Similar to Seargeant, Brian Carroll considered Shakespeare’s linguistic 
characterization of Celtic figures in his Henry V, an Elizabethan play known for its overt 
displays of nationalistic rhetoric.  That Shakespeare places three different Celtic 
characters in Henry V together in one scene provides the opportunity to determine what 
each Celtic character meant to the English nation.  With this so-called four captains scene 
in mind, Carroll argued that while the English characters go by their given names, 
Shakespeare distinguished the three Celtic characters by ethnic markers, primarily speech 
patterns unique to their nationalities when speaking English.  Although English 
characters address the Irish, Scottish, and Welsh figures as “Irish,” “Scot,” and “Welch” 
[sic] respectively – seemingly reducing them to caricatures of their nations – the Welsh 
figure is known as “Fluellen” before and after the four captains scene with the other two 
Celts.  This scene, thus, “sets up a sort of matrix of nationality and individuality with 
each of the Celtic figures linked to their ‘ethnic ciphers’” while the English “requires no 
ethnic marking at all,” emphasizing the prestige culture of the English.59  While this 
scene establishes the Celtic characters as foreign, Fluellen inhabits a unique space within 
the play, retaining both his Welsh national traits but also his individuality, further 
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emphasized when the king chooses to confide in him.60  In the four captains scene, 
Shakespeare illustrates the significance of language to national identity, but he also 
demonstrates the fine gradations of distance that come with language marked by accent,61 
with the implication that otherness is as arbitrary as nationality is imagined.  Significant 
to note, Shakespeare’s Scottish character speaks English in such a crude, guttural manner 
(“Ay’l de gud service, or I’ll lig i’ th grund for it, ay ...”62) that his speech is hardly 
intelligible.  This language pattern would appear to illustrate anti-Scot sentiment and thus 
English superiority.   
 In the parliamentary session that ran 1606-1607, the debate surrounding James’ 
desire for a unified British polity centred in large measure around the consequences of 
such a union on England’s legal system.  Several works in particular provide an overview 
of the Westminster debate.  Pocock drew the conclusion that the legally trained men of 
the late Tudor and early Stuart eras saw the common law as an immutable truth, with 
organic origins in time immemorial.63  Christopher Brooks’ and Kevin Sharpe’s 
refutation of Pocock’s argument maintained that the common law proved far more 
flexible than Pocock had thought.  They further argued that the many legal minds of the 
era knew of past foreign influence that had shaped the legal system in England.  They 
credited Edward Coke with transforming the common law into a cornerstone of 
Englishness that rallied patriotic elements in the House of Commons against James’ quest 
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for a political union with Scotland.64  Glenn Burgess argued that the debate surrounding 
the meaning and origins of the common law never became controversial during 
Elizabeth’s reign, for her rule never threatened its existence in the way that MPs thought 
James might with the implication that certain parliamentary groups considered the 
proposed British state a threat to Englishness.65  
While Scottish history lies beyond the purview of this thesis, it is worth noting 
that the Scots watching the union debate unfold in London after their king acceded to the 
English throne in 1603 were not impressed.  Certainly, the Scottish body politic 
compensated for the loss of their king with the pride that came from the knowledge that 
their historic rivals looked north to maintain England’s royal dynasty.  However, the anti-
Scot fervour emanating from certain quarters of the Westminster Parliament angered 
Scottish MPs in Edinburgh whose support for union quickly cooled.66  One English 
parliamentarian’s rhetoric proved so crass, he spent time in the Tower for it.  Sir 
Christopher Piggott notoriously told his fellow MPs in 1607 that the Scots were 
“perfidious, barbarous, faithless, bloodthirsty, and treacherous” – and that the only 
imaginable relationship the two countries could possibly share would be that of “judge 
and thief.”67  This sort of rhetoric shocked the Scots and prompted the Sir Thomas Craig 
to write a rebuttal.  Acknowledging his country’s paucity of material wealth, Craig 
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argued that Scots could nevertheless boast the “antiquity of their nation” and “an 
untarnished record of independence.”68  The Scots saw the Union of the Crowns as a 
conjoining of two sovereign countries, coming together as equals.  They were of one 
mind when they rejected the Anglocentric interpretation of history that framed James’ 
accession to the English throne as a re-founding of Brutus’ empire.  Unlike the English, 
the Scots could claim an independent existence with a royal line dating back to Fergus I 
in 330 BC.69  Craig called on the English to join the Scots to create “a new history of 
Britain … written with the utmost regard to accuracy.”70  Craig’s plea notwithstanding, 
the English would have none of it.  Monmouth, Holinshed, and Foxe had already written 
their history, a narrative that gave them the self-evident claim to dominant status, a 
perception grounded in time immemorial.71  
Although early seventeenth-century England was rife with Scotophobia, the 
English rejected a full political union with Scotland because of James’ drive to create a 
union of equal partners between the two countries.  His efforts inflamed English anxiety 
about the place of their country in such a union and thus prompted a change in the 
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perception of the national self.  As a consequence, for many, Englishness became more 
narrowly defined – more insular – during the first nine years of James’ reign in the 
southern kingdom.   One of the great ironies of the Stuart king’s plan to politically unify 
Britain was the English rejection of historic notions of themselves as Britons.  Ultimately, 
James’ reign was a catalyst that precipitated many Westminster MPs to re-evaluate their 
place within the British Isles.  In effect, they re-affirmed the primacy of English cultural 
and political hegemony in the region.  Although scholars have researched the English 
sense of national self in the early seventeenth century, they have not made the connection 
between the Scottish king and Englishness.72  Unlike other research that historians and 
literary scholars have published, this thesis argues that many English subjects rejected a 
more expansive alternate identity in the guise of Britishness.  Indeed, as a consequence of 
James’ reign, early seventeenth-century expressions of English national identity exhibited 
an underlying tension between remaining hegemonic and becoming insular – and British 
when the appellation preserved the primacy of Englishness. 
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The following three chapters trace the chronology of events beginning with the 
king’s arrival in London in 1603.  The first chapter examines the initial euphoria that 
surrounded his accession to the throne and the practical concerns of English MPs with 
unifying two countries with dissimilarities in population size, economic wealth, and legal 
systems and determining whether a new country of Great Britain and its British king 
would invalidate all legal acts and agreements passed under an English monarch.  The 
second chapter looks at the debate through a cultural prism, focusing on the English 
rejection of union for patriotic reasons.  Chapter three analyzes the hardening of those 
concerns, culminating in the debate surrounding the significance of the English common 
law, and by extension, the ancient constitution.  Throughout the union debate, opposition 
stemmed disproportionately from insecurity among many English parliamentarians about 
the rightful place of England in the British Isles rather than from base Scotophobia.  
Despite a brief flirtation with the concept of a Greater Britain, the accession of James I 
(VI) provoked widespread assertions of English sentiment – reflected in Westminster 
debates, among Gunpowder Plot conspirators, and through claims regarding English 
common law.  These assertions were further reflected in the period’s dramatic literature. 




The Accession of King James to the English Throne 
and the Beginnings of English Disaffection for Union, 1603 
 
  
 Despite the widespread euphoria that surrounded James’ accession, the reign of 
the first self-styled King of Great Britain did little to bolster the ranks of Englishmen and 
women who considered themselves British.  Published sources from the late Tudor and 
early Stuart periods suggest an ambiguous relationship between the English and a greater 
British identity.  Using Early English Books Online (EEBO), a search of treatises, drama, 
poetry, and sermons in five-year increments chronologically from 1590 through 1610 
reveals that published overt expressions of a British national identity were rare.  During 
the last years of Elizabeth’s reign, the English perception of Britain and their connection 
to it proved tentative, aware of its outward manifestations while reluctant to accept the 
identity for themselves.  Although James’ accession produced an uptick in references to 
British and Briton, published sources suggest that his kingship and accompanying 
discussion of an Anglo-Scots union produced no perceptible indication that the English 
assumed a collective British identity, no matter the king’s wishes.         
 The increasing frequency with which British appeared belies the solidly English 
national consciousness that remained constant throughout the late Tudor and early Stuart 
years.  With the advent of Stuart rule and the debate surrounding union with Scotland, 
there was an increase in the number of published sources that used British rather than 
English to denote the early modern English.  However, the number of printed sources in 
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which British denoted the pre-Saxon Britons remained roughly unchanged after James’ 
accession in 1603.  From 1590 through 1600, only one source made use of British and 
that was to describe the growing overseas empire in the latter years of Elizabeth’s reign.1  
During the same ten-year period, British appeared in 43 published items to designate the 
contemporary Welsh, their language, and their pre-Saxon ancestors.2  Though it is 
important to note that EEBO does not provide access to every published source of the 
early modern period of English history, the references to British suggest that the English 
under Elizabeth did not identify as British, at least not directly.  The analysis leads to a 
similar conclusion during the first ten years of James’ reign.  From 1601 through 1610, 
British appeared in 20 sources.  Those appearing in the years 1603-1605 focus primarily 
on the celebration of James’ accession.3  However, during 1601 through 1610, British 
appeared in 44 published sources to describe the contemporary Welsh, their language, 
and the Britons of antiquity.  Tellingly, the authors of these manuscripts used British to 
describe the king, the crown, the nation, and even British blood, for example, but EEBO 
searches revealed no direct application of British to describe the English people – unless 
nation denotes people.4  In that case, three sources applied British to the English.5  
Indeed, one source in particular pointedly used English – rather than British – to signify 
                                                          
1 See Richard Hakluyt, The principal nauigations, voyages, traffiques and discoueries of the English nation 
made by sea or ouer-land, to the remote and farthest distant quarters of the earth (London, 1599). 
2 For two instances of British used to denote the Britons of antiquity, see Barnabe Rich, Parthenophil and 
Parthenophe Sonnettes, madrigals, elegies and odes (London, 1593), and Sir John Harington, A new 
discourse of a stale subject, called the metamorphosis of Ajax (London, 1596). 
3 For an especially heartfelt celebration of James’ accession, see John Dee, To the Kings most excellent 
Maiestie (London, 1604).   
4 For an example of British nation likely used to designate people, see Thomas Heywood, Troia Britanica 
(London, 1609).  
5 See Thomas Heywood, Troia Britanica (London, 1609); Barnabe Rich, Roome for a gentleman, or the 
second part of faultes collected and gathered for the true meridian of Dublin in Ireland, and may serve fitly 
else where about London, and in many other partes of England (London, 1609); Thomas Middleton, A mad 
world, my masters as it hath been lately in action by the Children of Paules (London, 1608). 
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the country’s people, implying an affirmation of the country’s insular, introverted 
national identity.6  Though the increasing references to British in extant published 
sources indicate a willingness by some to embrace an Anglo-British identity, these 
records often reveal an eagerness to flatter the new king.  This data further suggests a 
rather static disinclination to embrace overt signs of Britishness.7    
 The use of Briton in published material followed a similar pattern with the 
implication that the English remained steadfast in their reluctance to follow their king to a 
new British identity.  From 1590 through 1600, Briton denoted the English in one 
history,8 and likewise, from 1601 through 1605, Briton designated the English in one 
source.9  Concurrently, Briton appeared in seven sources in which it pertained to the 
contemporary Welsh and pre-Saxon Britons.10  However, from 1606 through 1610, the 
use of Briton to reference the English people increased to a meagre four sources while the 
references to the contemporary Welsh and pre-Saxon Britons increased to 15, suggesting 
little affinity for a British identity on the part of the English.  When Briton appeared in 
print, it nearly always denoted the Welsh, and nearly always members of that nation in 
antiquity.11  In describing themselves in the late Tudor and early Stuart periods, the 
English remained English. 
                                                          
6 See Roger Hacket, A sermon principally entreating of the crosse in Baptisme (London, 1606).  
7 Research collected via EEBO (Accessed July through August 2017).  Only published material of English 
origin was examined for this study. 
8 See Richard Hakluyt, The principal nauigations, voyages, traffiques and discoueries of the English nation 
made by sea or ouer-land, to the remote and farthest distant quarters of the earth (London, 1599). 
9 See Richard Bancroft, Certaine demandes with their grounds (London, 1605). 
10 For an example of Briton used to denote the contemporary Welsh, see William Camden, Remaines of a 
greater worke, concerning Britaine, the inhabitants thereof, their languages, names, surnames (London, 
1605); one work that exemplifies the use of Briton in conjunction with the Britons of antiquity is Francis 
Bacon, Sir Francis Bacon his apologie, in certaine imputations concerning the late Earle of Essex 
(London, 1604). 
11 Research collected via EEBO (Accessed July through August 2017).  Only published material of English 
origin was examined for this study. 
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 Despite the relief that came with the accession of the first Stuart king of England, 
his sense of a pan-British identity prompted many of the ruling and social elites to turn 
away from a British perspective of Britain when it appeared to contradict early sixteenth-
century English expectations of their country’s hegemony in the British Isles.  Although 
the English gladly received their Scottish king, James’ disregard for English national 
mythology and parliamentary traditions engendered resistance against his proposed 
union.  Even before the union debate erupted with full force, the king’s division of his 
privy council evenly between Scots and English together with his Scottish bedchamber 
retinue caused disquiet.  That James subjected his English councillors to the indignity of 
playing a secondary role in their own country forced many English in his court and in the 
Commons to think his new British approach to governance an affront to their national 
sensibilities.  They simply could not bring themselves to see these measures from the 
king’s Scottish perspective.  Their early disappointment in his reign hinged upon three 
specific areas of concern:  First, the king’s desire to bring his fellow Scots into the 
decision-making process of governance inflamed jealousies among the English.  Second, 
English parliamentarians simply could not understand how two countries with widely 
divergent populations and wealth could possibly come together as one politically united 
country.  Finally, many MPs could not countenance an equal partnership that would have 
reduced English dominance in Britain.  James’ assumption of the persona of a British 
monarch with its trappings of national flag, name, and nascent British identity without 
parliamentary approval engendered further concern among Westminster MPs, anxiety 
that lay largely with a threatened sense of national superiority.  In these three areas of 
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concern, MPs exhibited a fear of a loss of the primacy of England’s place in Britain and 
with it an English identity built upon superiority. 
 
The English receive James as an English king.         
 The aversion to a British national identity that the English appear to have 
developed in the first decade of James’ reign might seem surprising in light of the general 
euphoria that his accession unleashed.  However, they expected James to rule as an 
English king who would not overturn age-old assumptions of English primacy in 
Britain.12  During the king’s progress southward, crowds turned out to meet him along his 
way.  The celebration illustrates the relief that the country felt at the peaceful transition of 
power.  Though the heirless Queen Elizabeth had died – a prospect that had filled many 
with dread, the unhappy event took place, and her replacement quickly took her stead 
with minimal disruption.  Despite the anti-Scottish sentiment that was pervasive in 
English society at the time of James’ accession to the throne, the people of his new realm 
appear to have been largely unconcerned with his origins.13  Sir Roger Wilbraham, 
former Solicitor General in Ireland, described the response to Elizabeth’s death once 
word spread that James was the new sovereign:  “The people both in city and counties 
finding the just fear of forty years, for want of a known successor, dissolved in a minute 
did so rejoice, as few wished the gracious Queen alive again.”  He further wrote that the 
                                                          
12 Stewart, The Cradle King, 166; Burgess, Lawrence, and Wymer note that James was proclaimed king in 
Richmond only an hour after Elizabeth’s death, but Robert Cecil announced the Scot’s accession several 
hours later at Whitehall. Glenn Burgess, Jason Lawrence, and Rowland Wymer, introduction to The 
Accession of James I: Historical and Cultural Consequences, eds., Glenn Burgess, Jason Lawrence, and 
Rowland Wymer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), xiii.  
13 “Henry Earl of Northumberland to King James” in Correspondence of King James VI. of Scotland with 
Sir Robert Cecil and others in England, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, ed., John Bruce (London: 
Camden Society), 56; Jenny Wormald, ‘Gunpowder, Treason, and Scots,’ Journal of British Studies 24, no. 
2 (April 1985): 160. 
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new king’s subjects desired a continuation of the same “admirable peace under 
Elizabeth.”14  The following anonymous ballad demonstrates sorrow for the queen’s 
death while welcoming the new king: 
Now is the time that we 
must all forget, 
Thy sacred name 
oh sweet Elizabeth. 
Lament, lament, etc. 
 
Praying for King James, 
as earst we prayed for thee, 
In all submissive love  
and loyaltie. 
Lament, lament, etc.15 
 
Significantly, these two stanzas end with a refrain that reminds its listeners to “lament” 
for their queen’s death.  However, the ballad runs a total of twenty-five stanzas, all with 
the same refrain which quickly makes the command to lament sound forced, and thus 
disingenuous.  Furthermore, the notion that they “must all forget” suggests that the 
transition to the new king comes naturally, an idea further supported by the tired refrain.  
It is important to note that this ballad – like Wilbraham’s description of the broad 
euphoria that erupted with the proclamation of James’ accession – appears to ignore 
Scotland and James’ Scottish heritage.  Though these lines of verse include references to 
England, they are completely devoid of a Scottish presence, with the implication that the 
people of England expected James to rule the country as an English monarch, devoting 
                                                          
14 Roger Wilbraham, The Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham, ed. Harold Spencer Scott in The Camden 
Miscellany, Volume the Tenth (London: Camden Society, 1902), 54-5. 
15 Anonymous, “A mournefull Dittie, entituled Elizabeths losse, together with a welcome for King Iames,” 
[1603]. The ballad’s entire refrain proves seemingly prescient given the ruling elite’s anxieties that James’ 
Scottish Bedchamber and desire for an Anglo-Scottish union unleashed: “Lament, lament, lament / you 
English Peeres / Lament your losse possest / so many yeeres.” Huntington Library accessed via the UCSB 
English Broadside Ballad Archive.  (Accessed May 4, 2017). 
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the bulk of his attention to the southern kingdom.16  The ballad leaves, anyway, no 
impression that the English people saw themselves as overtly British or as Britons.  
 As the king reached the approaches to London, the masses of people out to greet 
him exploded in number, underscoring broad support for the new ruler.  The Lord Mayor 
of London and the Aldermen were on hand.  One eye witness described the throng of 
people “in the highways, fields, meadows, closes, and on trees so great that they covered 
the beauty of the fields; and so greedy were they to behold the countenance of the king 
that with much unruliness they injured and hurt one another.”17  According to 
Wilbraham, 40,000 of the king’s new subjects turned out to see him along his southward 
journey, and 100,000 English men and women arrived in London from the countryside to 
celebrate.  So many people that they “swarmed” him “at every back gate and privy door, 
to his great offence.”18  James took note of the reception that greeted him south of the 
border: 
Shall it ever be blotted out of my mind how at my first entry into this kingdom, 
the people of all sorts rid and ran, nay rather flew to meet me; their eyes flaming 
nothing but sparkles of affection, their mouths and tongues uttering nothing but 
sounds of joy, their hands, feet, and all the rest of their members in their gestures 
discovering a passionate longing and earnestness to meet and embrace their new 
Sovereign?19 
 
Whether the masses turned out simply for the historic spectacle that James’ arrival 
presented or because of a sincere respect or even admiration for the king is immaterial.  
The importance of the event lies with the enthusiasm that welcomed the king to his new 
country.  That he was Scottish generated little apparent concern.     
                                                          
16 Russell, “James VI and I and Rule Over Two Kingdoms,” 152. 
17 John Nichols, ed., The Progresses, Processions, and Magnificent Festivities of King James the First, vol. 
1 (London: J.B. Nichols, 1828), 113-14. 
18 Wilbraham, The Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham, 56. 
19 CJ (March 22, 1604): 1, 142. 
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 Like members of the general population who greeted the king, many of the 
English ruling elite proved initially pleased with James’ accession to their country’s 
throne.  Wilbraham reported that “the King is of sharpest wit and invention, ready and 
pithy speech, an exceeding good memory; of the sweetest, pleasantest and best nature 
that ever I knew; desiring nor affecting anything but true honour.”20  The Venetian 
ambassador, Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli reported that he heard  
on all sides that the King is a man of letters and of business, fond of the chase and 
of riding, sometimes indulging in play. These qualities attract men to him, and 
render him acceptable to the aristocracy.  Besides English, he speaks Latin and 
French perfectly and understands Italian quite well.  He is capable of governing, 
being a prince of culture and intelligence above the common.21 
             
A month later, Scaramelli met the king in person and noted “an infinity of other lords 
almost in an attitude of adoration.”22  The French ambassador in London reported 
“universal” contentment after the accession of the king who “now finds such conformity 
to his wishes and such rapid union among all, notwithstanding the great difference of 
temperament which exists between the English and the Scottish.”  The source of the 
uniform support lay in:  
the good opinion the English have of his character, by the fact that he has sons, 
and because he is already versed in government. Add to this the alarm that 
everyone feels lest discord should open the door to foreigners.  All these 
considerations have counselled to unanimity and promptness in receiving and 
recognising him.23   
 
Whether the ambassador understood the irony of his observation is impossible to know.  
He suggested, however, that the English did not consider James foreign – this at a time 
                                                          
20 Wilbraham, The Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham, 60. 
21 Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, Calendar of State Papers Venetian 
[Hereafter CSPV] (April 24,1603), 10:  2-16. 
22 Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, CSPV (May 28, 1603), 10:  28-42. 
23 M. de Beaumont, “Letter from the French Ambassador in London to the French Ambassador in Spain,” 
CSPV  (May 1-15,1603), 10: 16-28.  Emphasis added. 
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when anti-Scottish xenophobia punctuated all socio-economic strata of the English 
population.  On the face of it, James appeared to tick all the boxes, bringing to the throne 
not only immediate stability but also the promise of an enduring royal dynasty in the 
guise of at least one male heir.  The English rallied around their new king for the good of 
the country, embracing him and his progeny for the sake of perpetual peace, but they also 
expected him to rule as an English king. 
 
Initial signs of disappointment with King James. 
 Despite the general support in the English population for James at the start of his 
reign in his southern kingdom, he soon disappointed his various government officials.  
For some this disappointment took hold even as the king made his month-long progress 
south to claim the throne in London.  Along the way, James began the practice of freely 
bestowing titles on local gentlemen on the advice of Scots accompanying his train.  
Rumours were afloat that James’ Scottish favourites received bribes from English 
gentlemen in exchange for knighthoods in numbers that prompted his English ministers 
to recoil at the apparent indiscriminate nature of his generosity.24  Commenting on this 
situation, Wilbraham wrote in his journal that “it grew a publick spech that Englishe had 
the blowes and Scottish the crownes.”25  Wilbraham suggested that the English faced 
disadvantage vis-à-vis James and his Scottish courtiers.  Although he conveniently 
overlooked the English who gained in prestige from this arrangement, his journal entry 
                                                          
24 I.H. Jeayes, ed., The Letters of Philip Gawdy, 1579-1616 (London: Nichols and Sons, 1906), 128; John 
Nichols, ed., The Progresses, processions and magnificent festivities of James the First, vol. I (London: 
Nichols, 1828), 88-93; Stewart, The Cradle King, 168. 
25 Wilbraham, The Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham, 55-7. 
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presages the sort of territorial jealousy James eventually inflamed as he attempted to 
move his agenda through the House of Commons.   
 
The English presumption of cultural and political hegemony. 
 Arguably more significant than the 1604 public celebration for gauging the sense 
of national sentiment, Anthony Munday’s pageant, The Triumphs of Re-United Britannia, 
took place the following year in 1605 on the streets of London as part of the Lord 
Mayor’s Show.26  Written in response to pressure to commemorate the antiquity of 
Britain,27 Munday grounded parts of his narrative in the various facets of the Brute 
legend.  Essentially the English national origins myth, the story of Brute gave the English 
people a connection to ancient Britain.  This assumption of English imperial primacy 
rested upon this national mythology rich with relatively recent historic underpinnings.  
The Brute myth and the English sense of entitlement to the whole of Britain largely 
originated with Geoffrey of Monmouth’s twelfth-century History of the Kings of 
Britain.28  This tract presented the island’s story, tracing the trajectory of its history from 
the arrival of Brutus in Britain through the Germanic settlement in the fifth and sixth 
centuries.29  A Welsh cleric, Monmouth narrated the purported origins of the British 
people from the time of their original settlement of Britain in the twelfth century BC until 
their defeat by Germanic tribes upon their arrival in Britain.  A history of the Welsh and 
                                                          
26 Sara Trevisan, “The Lord Mayor’s Show in Early Modern London,” Literature Compass 11, no. 8 
(2014): 538. 
27 Conrad Russell, “1603: The End of English National Sovereignty,” in The Accession of James I: 
Historical and Cultural Consequences, ed., Glenn Burgess, Rowland Wymer, and Jason Lawrence (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 3. 
28 MacColl, “The Meaning of ‘Britain,’” 249; Mason, “Scotching the Brut,” 60-62. 
29 MacColl, “The Meaning of ‘Britain,’” 249. Mason places the Germanic defeat of the Britons in the 
seventh century. See Mason, “Scotching the Brut,” 61.   
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their legends including Arthur, Monmouth’s work came to influence the way that the 
post-Conquest English saw themselves and their place in Britain.30  His treatise 
established the English perception of themselves as a people with ancient ties to Britain.  
In part, this belief allowed subsequent generations of Englishmen and women to accept 
the notion of England as the rightful hegemonic power over both Wales and Scotland.31  
Whether or not this history had any relation to the events as they actually transpired 
proved irrelevant, for this exercise in cultural appropriation gave the English and their 
kings a direct line back to antiquity and thus an indigenous, if rather specious, connection 
to the land.32  According to Monmouth’s myth, their original leader was Brutus, or Brute, 
the great-grandson of the Trojan Aeneas.  Upon the death of Brutus, the British kingdom 
was divided into thirds, each given to one of his sons.  As the eldest son, Locrine received 
the largest territory, Loegria or England, and by right, he was the most dominant.33  
Subsequent histories, including those of Holinshed, not only continued to promulgate 
Monmouth’s version of the past, replete with Brutus, they also maintained the theory of 
English superiority.34  By the end of the sixteenth century, John Foxe among others had 
mixed Protestantism into the tale to create the expectation that England was an elect 
country.35  At the time of James’ accession, the Brute myth had become widely known as 
                                                          
30 Mason, “Scotching the Brut,” 60-62.   
31 MacColl, “The Meaning of ‘Britain,’” 249. 
32 Mason, “Scotching the Brut,” 61; MacColl, “The Meaning of ‘Britain,’” 249.      
33 Mason, “Scotching the Brut,” 61; Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legume Angliae (London, [1471] 
1616), sig. E1v, EEBO (Accessed December 1, 2017).  
34 Mason, “Scotching the Brut,” 60-62.   
35 Patrick Collinson maintained that Foxe believed England to be an Elect Nation, not the Elect Nation.  
See Patrick Collinson, “A Chosen People? The English Church and the Reformation,” History Today 36, 
no. 3 (March 1986): 14-20.  In a more recent article, Andrew Escobedo proffered a similar argument, 
contending that while Foxe suggested that England enjoyed divine privilege, he never claimed the country 
was the Elect Nation. See Andrew Escobedo, “The Book of Martyrs: Apocalyptic Time in the Narrative of 
the Nation,” Prose Studies 20, no. 2 (1997): 1-17. The following excerpt from Actes and Monuments 
exemplifies Foxe’s ambivalence regarding England’s standing with the Christian deity: “There hath been 
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a fictionalized history with little connection to reality.36  However, the depiction of the 
Brute myth in Munday’s pageant suggests a comfortable relationship with Britishness so 
long as it kept the primacy of Englishness intact.  
 Although Munday’s The Triumphs of Re-United Britannia purports to celebrate 
the re-unification of Britain under James, the interplay between British and English 
elements reveals a highly Anglocentric vision of Britain.  Munday’s pageant processed 
through town, overtly celebrating Britain.  However, according to Tracey Hill, Munday 
engaged in “ideological slippage,” ostensibly honouring Britain but actually emphasizing 
England and its history.37  Thus, despite the narrator’s declaration at the outset that the 
“present conceit [will] reacheth unto the antiquitie of Brytaine,” Munday’s speaker 
quickly states it necessary to explain how “our country” gained the name of “England,” 
identifying with England while making no reference to Wales and Scotland.38  With 
actors taking the personae of Britannia, Brute, Loegria, Cambria, and Albania – the latter 
three representing England, Wales, and Scotland respectively – Munday’s script leaves 
little doubt of the presumed rightful English place within the British Isles.  Its subtext of 
English primacy is made all the more evident by the subheading and its direction that the 
“several children” (i.e., England, Wales, and Scotland) will speak “according to degrees 
of seating,” indicating a hierarchy with England at its top, followed by the obedient 
                                                                                                                                                                             
no region or country more fertile or fruitful for martyrs, than our own region of England.” Foxe also 
alluded to the Brute myth: “the Britons were taught first by the Grecians of the east church, rather than the 
Romans.” John Foxe, The Actes and Monuments of John Foxe, 1570, ed. Josiah Pratt. 8 vols., (London, 
1870), 3.581, 1.307.  
36 Burgess, Lawrence, and Wymer, introduction, xx. 
37 Tracey Hill, “‘Representing the awefull authoritie of soveraigne Majestie’: Monarchs and Mayors in 
Anthony Munday’s The Triumphes of Re-united Britania,” in The Accession of James I: Historical and 
Cultural Consequences, ed., Glenn Burgess, Rowland Wymer, and Jason Lawrence (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 18-19. 
38 Anthony Munday, The Triumphs of Re-United Britannia (London, 1605), sig. B2r, EEBO (Accessed 
December 29, 2017). 
41 
 
Wales, and at last, a compliant Scotland.39  England wishes for a “sacred union” 
whereupon Wales explains that it “yielded long ago,” with the implication that it 
surrendered itself to English domination.40  In a similar vein, Scotland suggests its 
willingness to fall into line, “when the all-ruling power doth so command” it to deliver its 
king to England.41  The three countries of Britain affirm their dedication to a unified 
British realm led by one British king.   
 Munday’s celebratory pageant, performed on the streets of London – the locus of 
English cultural and political power – actively connects England’s first Stuart monarch to 
the Brute myth and the country’s Tudor dynasty, and by doing so, calls into question 
Scotland’s separate existence apart from England and Wales.42  In presenting James, he 
appears to have wanted to reassure his audience that the Stuart king represented the 
continuation of the Tudors:  “And Scotland yielded out of Tudor’s race, / a true born bud, 
to sit in Tudor’s place.”43  The speaker emphasizes James’ Tudor genealogy, ancestry of 
far greater import than his Stuart.  In effect, Munday seems to have wanted to make 
James’ claim to the throne as legitimate as possible by downplaying the Scottish 
connection.  He suggested that Britain’s contentment would come from James’ 
continuation of the Tudor dynasty:  “We nere want a rose of Tudors tree, / to maintaine 
                                                          
39 Munday, Ibid., sig. B2v, EEBO (Accessed December 29, 2017). 
40 Munday, Ibid., sig. B4r, EEBO (Accessed December 29, 2017). 
41 Munday, Ibid., sig. B4r, EEBO (Accessed December 29, 2017).  Munday’s London portrayal of a pliant 
Scotland differs from the reality of a much more confident kingdom. Indeed, Alexander Seton, Lord Fyvie 
might have revealed his support for union when he wrote of the “inhabitants of the entire island of Britain” 
joining together to “stabilise and strengthen this complete and permanent union,” but that suggestion of 
support for a united British polity gives no indication of a diminution of his country’s position in such an 
Anglo-Scottish arrangement, for he wrote of the “ancient kingdom of Scotland and its renowned and 
powerful crown” to which God added “the realm of England.” See The Records of the Parliaments of 
Scotland to 1707, K.M. Brown et al eds (St Andrews, 2007-2018), 1604/4/6. Procedure: commission; 
asking of instruments. Date accessed: 25 April 2018. [Hereafter RPS].   
42 Munday, The Triumphs of Re-United Britannia, sig. B3v, EEBO (Accessed December 29, 2017). 
43 Munday, Ibid., sig. B3r, EEBO (Accessed February 24, 2018).   
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Britaines future happinesse, / To the worlds end in true tranquilitie.”44  Although Munday 
speaks of Britain, its happiness will come from a man whose lineage is comfortably 
English or Welsh.  James’ Scottish heritage is simply left out of the lines of verse.  The 
speaker’s optimism might have lain with Britain, but his sentiments were Anglocentric.  
This overarching focus on England prompts Hill to argue that England is the only one of 
the three in Munday’s pageant that apparently exists as a “definitive nation-state.”45  
Though the title speaks of “triumphs” of a re-united Britain, in reality, England ranks first 
among its sister nations, a presumption that the repeated use of “England” instead of 
“Britain” further emphasizes.  As a popular event with literary underpinnings, it provides 
insight into the English perspective of Scotland and the rightful place of England in a 
united Britain.  In the event, the pageant used the Brute myth to reinforce the impression 
of English cultural and political superiority throughout the whole of Britain.      
 Though the narrative celebrates a united Britain, the details leave no doubt about 
the cultural hegemony that places England securely atop that hierarchy with the 
implication that union should not come at the cost of English leadership.  The character 
of Britannia declares that she had also been called Albion, suggesting an historical 
precedent for English domination throughout the whole of Britain.46  In his text, Munday 
identified most readily with an Anglocentric perception of history, a stance that confirms 
Brian Levack’s premise that by the end of the sixteenth-century the English saw 
themselves as a distinct people.47  Although Munday’s pageant reflects this national 
consciousness, it seems particularly telling that he would take such an English stance 
                                                          
44 Munday, Ibid., sig. B3r, EEBO (Accessed February 24, 2018).   
45 Hill, “Monarchs and Mayors,” 19. 
46 Munday, The Triumphs of Re-United Britannia, sig. B2v, EEBO (Accessed December 29, 2017). 
47 Levack, The Formation of the British State, 21. 
43 
 
when his king wanted the country to assume a British identity.  Munday’s narrator 
identifies with England, noting how “the limits of Loegria were enlarged” eventually “by 
our owne conquests.”48  In turn, the “boundes between us and Scotland” were created, an 
odd part of Britain’s history to emphasize in a pageant meant to celebrate British unity.49  
The narrative honours James as the “second Brute” who brings England, Scotland, and 
Wales together “againe in blessed unity,” thus reversing the ancient mistake of dividing 
the original kingdom in three.50  However, the recurring appearance of “we” and “us” 
references English antecedents, excluding the Scots while forgetting the British union, 
the purported reason for the pageant.  Though England, Scotland, and Wales are “sister 
kingdoms”51 celebrating this “most happy day,”52 none of the place names – Troya Nova 
(London), Thamesis, Savarne (Severn), and Humber – has a connection with Scotland.53  
Munday’s narration negotiates English myth, dynastic history, and celebration of Britain, 
but the narrator’s Anglocentric perspective makes clear that the old national fault lines 
remain sharply defined, and the Britain it celebrates was an English one.   
 If Munday’s pageant revealed the presumption of English hegemony throughout 
Britain, English courtiers and counsellors in London expected that they would retain 
primacy in their own country’s government.  Although most of these men revealed no 
hint of an appreciation for a shared British identity with their Scottish counterparts, the 
pageant offered a celebration of British unity, and much of that celebration rested on the 
presupposition that the new monarch from Scotland would transform into an English 
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king, somehow forgetting his life and people north of the border.  Even as Elizabeth lay 
dying, politically ambitious members of some of England’s great families rode north, 
expecting to ingratiate themselves with James in the hopes of reaping the benefits of 
political power upon the king’s arrival in London.  It quickly became evident, however, 
that the new king was dividing his Chamber evenly between Scots and English with the 
expectation that the former would accompany the latter to England and operate with 
equal authority on the new Privy Council.  The presence of Scottish advisers so close to 
the king became an ongoing source of friction between James and the Commons and 
overshadowed the coming union debate.  In fact, even before the king reached London, 
Robert Cecil and Northampton met him at York in an attempt to dissuade him from 
including Scots on the English Privy Council.  They were sorely disappointed.  Two 
Englishmen, Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir John Fortescue, lost their official positions to 
Scots when they pressed the king to exclude them from his English Privy Council.54  
 Once in London, James inflamed sensitivities among his English counsellors by 
ensuring that Scots would play a prominent role in the inner-most circles in the king’s 
court. The Venetian ambassador remarked the “chagrin” the king caused the English 
when he “bestowed upon Scots” the “supreme offices,” reportedly making “these changes 
… in that highhanded manner.”55  Many of the Scots were simply members of the 
entourages whom the king and queen brought with them, household staff who had always 
worked for James and Anne.  However, the king placed the largest group of Scots in the 
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Bedchamber and Privy Council.  Bruce Galloway argued that as king of both Scotland 
and England, James’ decision to reserve half the Privy Council slots for the Scots was 
entirely fair and could have otherwise provoked discontent in Scotland had the Privy 
Councillors been entirely English.56  Yet Scotland had its own Privy Council; the English 
Privy Council had heretofore been English, and to MPs and counsellors alike, the king 
was ignoring expectations and practice by making the governing apparatus less English. 
In other words, the Scottish king remained Scottish in the eyes of many of his English 
subjects.  The efforts of Northampton, Cecil, Raleigh, and Fortescue suggest not so much 
base Scotophobia, but rather English discomfort with shared rule over their country and 
the accompanying loss of prestige for the ruling elite.   
 Along those same lines, James’ creation of a new department, the Bedchamber, 
became a major irritant to Parliament.  While the king ensured that the Privy Council 
remained evenly divided among Scots and English, he pushed that body to the periphery, 
and in its stead, James assembled the Bedchamber, made up wholly of Scots, 
demonstrating obvious favouritism in its composition.  Therein lay a double insult for 
English parliamentarians.  As a foretaste of union, James sought equal representation of 
the two nations on the Privy Council, but restricted Privy councillors from freely 
accessing their king while Scottish Bedchamber members faced no such restrictions.  
That the men with the greatest influence on the king’s governance of the English were 
Scottish offended Westminster MPs.  Several, in fact, accused Cecil of betrayal for 
arranging James’ succession.57  Even this early in his English reign, MPs could only see 
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that by favouring Scots, James was actively reinforcing their perception of his anti-
English bias, thus feeding the notion that their sovereign failed to identify with the 
English, something many of his southern subjects resented.58  From their perspective, 
their king stubbornly refused to let go of his role as king of a country the English had 
failed to conquer, thus injuring their national pride.59  Despite hints of his desire for 
union, James’ commitment to both kingdoms came as a surprise.  While still in 
Edinburgh in April 1603, the king ordered new signets engraved with the arms of 
England and Scotland placed together in union.60 Although many at Westminster 
expected their king to respect their notion of sovereignty – one that made England his 
foremost concern, James sought to govern both countries in equal measure. 
 English MPs might have had good reason for their initial upset at James’ 
favouritism for Scots and desire for an Anglo-Scottish union based upon political equality 
of the two kingdoms.  That astonishment in Westminster at James’ steadfast loyalty to his 
northern realm and its people might have originated with correspondence between the 
king and Sir Robert Cecil and a few others prior to his accession.  Though kept secret 
from Elizabeth, as early as 1601 Cecil began preparing for James to take the reigns of 
power upon the queen’s decease.61  As James VI of Scotland, he appeared ready to 
perform the office of English monarch without apparent especial regard for his native 
land.  Indeed, the king appeared more than prepared to make England his priority thereby 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that Herbert’s admission signifies James’ effort to placate the Commons as he began his push for Union.  
However, Herbert was the last English member admitted to the Bedchamber until 1615.  See Cuddy, 
“Anglo-Scottish Union and the Court of James I, 1603-1615,” 112.    
58 Jenny Wormald, “James VI and I: Two Kings or One?” History 68 (1983): 206, 208.    
59 Wormald, “James VI and I: Two Kings or One?,” Ibid.    
60 James VI and I, “Warrant to Charles Anthony, the King's engraver, to make two new signets with the 
union of the arms of England and Scotland, with inscriptions for the same.”  National Archives, Kew, 
England: 40/1/50. Accessed via State Papers Online. [Hereafter NA SP]   
61 Bruce, ed., Correspondence of King James VI, xxxvii-xxxviii. 
47 
 
preserving English primacy in Britain.  At times, James’ candour suggested the same sort 
of scorn for the Scots as might exist in certain quarters of the English elite, writing to 
Cecil that “it is a farre more barbarouse and stiffe nekkit people that I rule over.”62  In the 
same letter, James lamented that St. George rode an easy horse while James made do 
with “a wylde unreulie coalte.”63  Continuing in the same paragraph, he revealed 
affection for the southern kingdom when he spoke of the “natural loue I owe to 
England.”64  In these passages, James’ tone and message convey the ideals that 
conceivably flattered the sensibilities of many members of the English ruling elite.   
Moreover, throughout his correspondence, the king also provided specific signs that his 
reign would not upset the relationship between England and its neighbours and the status 
of counsellors.  The correspondence between the Scottish Edward Bruce and the English 
Henry Howard indicates that members of the elite expected James to rule without 
favouritism for his native countrymen.  Bruce wrote that the king would “alter no man in 
any office or charge he possesseth in the state.” He would nevertheless be at liberty to 
select the men around him for his own security, but even in such a case, James would not 
give Scots an advantage over the “Inglise.”65  In a letter the earl of Northumberland wrote 
to James, the former revealed to the latter a presumption of English superiority.  That he 
expressed such a notion to James suggests an expectation that the king would at least 
acquiesce to such beliefs.  Northumberland wrote that “the anexing of theas thrie 
kingdomms most neides be glorius and great … and happie for ws, since subiects ar euer 
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soe where largest dominions are.”66  Further in the same letter, Northumberland reveals a 
desire for an Anglo-Scottish union modelled on the Anglo-Welsh configuration, 
suggesting that an expressly anglicized British polity would come into existence during 
James’ reign.  Northumberland shared his presumption that his Majesty would “make 
[Scotland and England] one, as nowe England and Wales are,” with the king careful not 
to place more trust in the Scots than the English.  Northumberland anticipated that James 
would become more devoted to the subjects of his southern kingdom, writing that James’ 
English ancestry would provide him a source of “honor in being reputed a king of 
England [which] will be greatar then to be a king of Scottes.”67 In his missive to 
Northumberland, James appeared to assure the Englishman that if he were to take 
Elizabeth’s place as her successor, he would rule the country as she had, pledging to 
refrain from “invuerting, innouating, or making any alteration in the state, guuernement, 
or lawes; and besides, what confidence could I euer heaue in those that for pleasour of me 
hade betrayed there present soueraine?”68  In yet another letter to Northumberland, James 
makes clear that he would like “to knitte this whole Iland in a happie and perpetuall 
unitie,” acceding to the throne only “as the sonne and righteous aire of England … 
without any kind of alteration in steat or gouernment, as fare as possible I can.”  He 
pledged that all men already serving her Majesty would so continue during his reign, 
making no significant changes as king of Scotland.69  The king’s letters paint a picture of 
an heir to the throne ready to serve England with little deviation from Elizabeth’s regard 
for her people and counsellors.  Despite the image of the rather pliant prince ready to 
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govern according to English hopes and expectations, a few years prior to this 
correspondence, James had written of the rightful power of a monarch.  In the following 
excerpt from his treatise, James leaves no doubt as to the proper locus of national power:   
And as ye see it manifest, that the King is Over-Lord of the whole Land:  So is he 
master over every person that inhabiteth the same, having power over the life and 
death of every one of them.  For although a just Prince will not take the life of any 
of his Subjects without a clear Law:  Yet the same Laws, whereby he taketh them, 
are made by himself, or his predecessors.  And so the power flows always from 
himself.70   
 
He was a ruler prepared to reign as he saw fit, no matter the ideals MPs and courtiers 
sought to impose.  Thus, when James appeared to alter course from his predecessor and 
the apparently Anglocentric beliefs expressed in his letters, many English MPs and 
courtiers found it especially difficult to accept his Scottish Bedchamber and proposed 
Anglo-Scottish union comprised of equal kingdoms.          
 Simply put, the English wanted the king; they did not want his country or 
countrymen and the Britishness they represented.  They expected James to assume the 
role of English monarch whose focus remained solely on their country without regard for 
Scotland.71  Among many English MPs, the proper relationship between themselves and 
the Scots would have been imperial master and colonial subaltern.  When James assumed 
the throne, he appeared to have inverted that relationship.  Worse, he wanted to use law 
to enshrine a new reality in which master and subaltern were equal, an idea that unnerved 
many of the ruling elite at Westminster.  The English had tried for years to colonize the 
Scots, to make Scotland a vassal country obedient to England.  That such efforts had 
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failed proved a particular irritant.  However, what had been a frustrating historical 
annoyance had transformed into a nearly intolerable situation upon James’ accession.  
Wormald framed the situation as one in which James’ English parliamentarians wanted to 
“train their ruler who had, against the odds, become their king, in their values, to turn him 
into an acceptable king of England.  They were therefore trapped in an impossible 
situation.  For how does one colonise one’s king?”72  Even as late as 1610, Nicholas 
Fuller told his fellow MPs that they needed to school James in his responsibilities 
according to the laws of England.  He argued that giving James such instruction would 
allow the English to be “true” to themselves.73   
James’ predisposition to keep Scottish courtiers around him provoked jealousy 
amongst his English counsellors, and surviving papers from the time reveal the petty, 
petulant behaviour of several parliamentarians who rejected any notion that the king 
might divide his attention between England and Scotland.  The English simply refused to 
recognize the relationship with the Scots in the way that James envisioned it.74  Even 
before James arrived in London, a number of English councillors demonstrated their 
resistance to sharing power with Scots.  When the earl of Kinloss arrived in London 
armed with orders from the king guaranteeing his place on the Privy Council, he ran up 
against “the disgust of the Lords, who pretended that no one but Englishmen should hold 
honours and office in England.”75  Key to governing Scotland was the king’s written 
correspondence with his Privy Councillors in Edinburgh.  He put his Scottish courtiers in 
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London, especially those in his Bedchamber, in charge of that correspondence, thus 
placing this connection beyond the reach of English advisers on the London-based Privy 
Council.  In effect, their king acted independently of the English with the result that 
competition between the Scots and English councillors increased, and along with it, the 
resentment of many English MPs.76  When Sir John Stanhope, the Vice Chamberlain of 
England, learned that James had appointed a gentleman in Scotland to the position of 
Vice Chamberlain of that country, Stanhope reacted in outrage and refused to return to 
court.77   
 
Practical challenges of an Anglo-Scottish union. 
 James was king in London just two months when he saw fit to proclaim the two 
kingdoms unified, underscoring his sense of royal sovereignty, and, one might argue, 
disregard for his English MPs.  On May 19, 1603, James issued “A Proclamation for the 
uniting of England and Scotland,” thus making clear that he saw no reason to debate the 
merits of such a union.  For him, the Union of the Crowns was only the beginning, the 
preliminary step to full political union.  What is particularly striking about the 
Proclamation is the near matter-of-fact presentation of the benefits of full political union.  
Union reflected the will of the Christian deity with the implication that James’ objective 
was divinely ordained.  With James king of both countries, “his Princely disposition to 
Justice” allowed him to “repress” the violence on both sides of the border, a hitherto 
perennial problem.  However, “it hath now pleased God, in his great blessing to this 
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whole Island, by his Majesties lawfull succession to the Imperial Crowne of England” to 
bring thereby the “extremities” into “the middle” and thus enforce their “obedience.”  
The choice, by James’ reckoning, was black and white, a good versus evil dichotomy.  
Those people in the Marches who opposed union or “pretend[ed] ignorance” of it were 
“wicked” and “Enemies to Peace, Justice, and quietnesse,” who “fed themselves with a 
sinister conceit and opinion, that no such union should be established,” preferring 
“robbery and oppression.”  Concurrently, those people on both sides of the border who 
supported union were his “good Subjects.”  Thus, to reassure “all his good Subjects” who 
might still suffer doubt of the proposed union and to undermine the anti-union efforts of 
“wicked and turbulent persons,” he thought it timely to issue the present document, so 
“the best disposed Subjects of both Realmes of all qualities” will know of the 
advantageous “Presents” that union will provide them as they possess “a most earnest 
desire, that the sayd happy Union should bee perfected.”  Until the parliaments of 
England and Scotland approved such an incorporating union, James would conduct 
himself as if his desired union already existed and called upon his subjects to do the 
same, to think of themselves as one people inhabiting one kingdom.78   
 Although there were MPs who thought union best – Frances Bacon to name one – 
union with Scotland struck many English MPs as an unnecessary reduction of English 
stature, and many at Westminster simply found a political merger of Scotland and 
England logistically perplexing.79  These parliamentarians proved anything but wicked.  
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In the early stages of the debate, two primary concerns emerged, the first practical and 
the second symbolic.  The practical concerns dealt with the logistics of bringing two 
countries together into one political unit when the imbalances in wealth and population 
proved stark and prohibitive.  The symbolic concerns stemmed from the effort to re-brand 
the country Great Britain with a new joint flag and a king with a new royal style.  The 
debates reveal that the king’s initial drive for union provoked a backlash that 
demonstrated a desire to maintain England’s unique identity and a fear of the loss of it.  
In April 1604, James prodded the House of Commons to begin discussions on merging 
Scotland and England into one British nation.  In actuality, the Lords took the initiative, 
asking to hold a conference with the Commons.  In a declaration dated April 16, the 
Lords suggested that the unified country take the name Great Britain.80         
 Many of the men in Parliament who were keen to preserve English sovereignty 
within their own country, if not Britain, felt that the Scots failed to see their proper place.  
Running England was meant to be an English concern, not Scottish or British.  Although 
the attitude of the English ruling elite was manifestly Anglocentric, the country’s size 
appeared to confirm their belief that England should take precedence in Britain.  That 
perspective coupled with the practicalities of union convinced many at Westminster that 
conjoining Scotland and England would be logistically impossible.  By any measure, 
England was a far larger country on most every count.  Certainly, England’s economy 
was of greater consequence.  David Stevenson estimated that as late as 1625 Scottish 
ordinary revenues totalled £16,500 sterling, though already in September 1607, English 
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receipts were recorded as £324,075.81  The disparity in revenues is striking, and indeed, 
compared to Scotland, English elites seemed awash in material prosperity.  At the time of 
James’ accession, his wealth as king of Scotland was perhaps on par with the wealthiest 
English earl, and as king of England, his income was approximately twenty times his 
revenues received as James VI in Edinburgh.  To add to the English sense of superiority, 
England’s population could possibly have amounted to five times that of Scotland.  
Finally, the governing apparatus in England was far more developed than its counterpart 
in Scotland, giving the English one more reason to assume an air of superiority.82         
 
The concept of an equal partnership and the loss of English dominance in Britain.   
 Although concerns about practicalities marked the beginnings of the union debate, 
more broadly, many English MPs saw conquest in James’ endeavours, inflaming a 
discomfort grounded in the age-old notion of English superiority.  James wanted a united 
kingdom in which England and Scotland would enjoy equal status.83  For him, it was a 
self-evident fact that the countries belonged together, united as one polity.  However, he 
also had practical reasons for rebranding his two realms “Great Britain.”  It soon became 
obvious to him and other government officials that two independent countries meant two 
separate royal lines of succession.  That meant that the two kingdoms, presently linked 
only through James, could eventually end up with two monarchs who would make a 
union of the two countries unworkable.  Reflecting those fears, Thomas Wentworth told 
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his fellow MPs in the Commons that “England and Scotland” were “two distinct 
Kingdoms, two Commonweals.  They acknowledge no Crown, no King, but of Scotland:  
We acknowledge none, but that of England.”84  Not only did Wentworth reveal two years 
after his king’s accession that the Scots still struck him as foreign – no joint British 
identity apparent – his speech also suggests discomfort with the arrangement linking the 
two countries in the body of the king.  Furthermore, he spoke to the crux of the debate.  
In effect, a unified country could end up with two leaders, each claiming sovereignty.  
Not only was Wentworth sharing the majority opinion on the topic, he also outlined a 
scenario whereby Britain consisted of two independent nation-states.85  With different 
laws of succession, and sovereignty vested in each country’s monarch, Scotland and 
England could not legally enter into a political union.  Even if such a union were to exist, 
a legal nightmare could potentially ensue, if the country ended up with rival monarchs 
representing separate British regions.86  For the English, there was an additional fear.  
The thought of two national successions conjured visions of invasion and eventual 
conquest, were the Scottish ruler friendly with England’s foreign enemies.87  For most 
Westminster MPs union appeared unworkable, if not altogether threatening.       
 Unfortunately for James, his cherished project of union ran up against a legal 
hurdle that appeared to stop it before it began.  The king could not ask either country’s 
parliament to alter the laws of succession without running the risk of calling his own 
kingship into question.  In an odd twist of history, James’ great uncle, Henry VIII, had 
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prohibited a Stuart line of succession to the English throne in his will, a document that 
the Westminster Parliament sanctioned.  In effect, Henry attempted to preclude Scottish 
royal control of England, thereby making a future British union manifestly English.  
Rejecting Henry’s choice of the English-born Grey line, James declared that the divine 
right of hereditary succession made his claim the most legitimate, a theory subsequently 
enshrined in his Act of Recognition.  Approved by English MPs, this act declared that no 
parliament had the authority to prohibit legitimate hereditary succession.  It followed, 
therefore, that James could not simply ask his two parliaments to alter or end a line of 
succession from either country to allow him to unify England and Scotland under one 
remaining royal dynasty.  To remedy this problem, James unilaterally transformed his 
two kingdoms into Great Britain, thus creating a new British succession that brought the 
two countries together under the king’s sovereignty, if not as a unified political unit.  To 
the king’s supporters, this new royal style made sense.  James was now the king of Great 
Britain, in effect the head of one body, not two.88  Several years later, this point formed 
the backbone of the Naturalization Act of 1607; the proposed law stated that “by [this] 
blessed union the people and subjects of both the said realmes are made members of one 
entire body under one head.”89  In 1608, Robert Cecil echoed these same sentiments 
when writing to Lord Dunfermline, lord chancellor of Scotland.  He made mention of 
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“God, who hath made us one body under one head.”90  Unfortunately for James, to many 
MPs, this rhetoric sounded too much like the consequences of losing a war.  In many of 
their minds, the king’s Great Britain sounded like the loss of the England they had always 
known.91   
 The idea of conquest haunted the House of Commons and made its members wary 
of James’ plan to bring the two countries together, starting with renaming his united 
kingdoms and adopting a new royal style in October 1604.  James justified his decision as 
God’s will, emphasizing that Great Britain was not a product of conquest.  That the king 
had seemingly proclaimed into existence a new country – if in name only – alarmed MPs, 
many of whom found it an encroachment onto their rights as Englishmen and 
parliamentarians.92  While the debate on union punctuated the parliamentary agenda 
throughout 1604, the discussions that took place on April 16 through 24 reveal the 
concerns of many English MPs regarding the consequences of the king’s objectives for 
their country and its place in Britain and Europe.  Although a number of voices joined the 
ongoing debate, on April 19 Bacon and Sir Edwin Sandys took the lead, the former 
supporting the king’s new royal style, and the latter staunchly opposing it.  Bacon thought 
that the name Great Britain lent the country a certain grandeur not unlike that of the 
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Roman Empire, even suggesting that James take the title of emperor.  Changing a 
country’s name could not, Bacon argued, change the fundamental quality of its people, 
institutions, and values.  Sandys, like many of his fellow MPs, rejected Bacon’s take on 
changing the country’s name and opposed James’ new royal style.  He argued that names 
do indeed determine the nature of countries and that the English House of Commons had 
no right to create laws for Great Britain.  Sandys and many other MPs simply could not 
countenance losing the “ancient name of England, so famous and victorious.”93  It was 
the Scots who needed to relinquish their country’s name, whether to call itself Britain or 
England was not made clear in this debate, but the gist was that the Scots needed to 
remain the junior partner.94  In a sign of things of come, several members voiced 
concerns about the English legal system, suggesting that it was incumbent upon the Scots 
to adopt English law, with the implication that the English would retain their 
“precedency,” now seemingly threatened by loss.95  In a statement especially telling for 
the insight it provides into the English mindset, Secretary Herbert defended the king’s 
desire to change the country’s name to Great Britain, arguing that England would not lose 
its “dignities and privileges” and that the governments of “Scotland, Ireland, and the Isles 
adjacent” would move to London.96  The implication was clear.  No matter the country’s 
name, England would remain the dominant power in the region.         
 In their ongoing debate about union and the king’s proposed new style, other MPs 
joined Bacon and Sandys, including members of the House of Commons Committee of 
the Union.  According to this committee, James’ agenda to refashion Scotland and 
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England into a unitary British realm was for the English akin to being “conquered.”97  
Opening with “the more we wade, the more we doubt,” the committee opposed the loss 
of their country’s historic name:  “Amongst worldly things, nothing [is] more dear unto 
us than our Name.”98  They claimed that in losing their name the English would “drown” 
and lose the “precedency” over Scotland.  A change in the country’s name would lead to 
confused government records including those of the court system; they might suffer the 
loss of the King’s Bench, for its relocation to Scotland would become a possibility.  
Furthermore, the English would need to contend with “a deluge of Scots,” not unlike a 
form of conquest.  By the committee’s reckoning, the king’s unilateral change of the 
country’s name was without precedent.  They felt that James’ desire to change his royal 
style and the name of the country had far reaching implications, essentially transforming 
England into a country unrecognizable to his Westminster MPs:  “The Name of the King, 
of the Kingdom, of the People:  Alter One, alter all.”99  While the king pursued his 
objective of reinventing himself into the king of Great Britain and designing the new 
union flag, English parliamentarians would pursue their own “project” for their country’s 
“security,” indicating a need to insulate themselves and their country from the threat of 
foreign influence.100  In an act of irony apparently lost on MPs, a member of the 
Commons, whose name remains unrecorded, stood and criticized James for assuming the 
identity of a British king, purposefully connecting himself to a long line of British 
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monarchs leading back into antiquity, not entirely dissimilar to former Tudor rulers.101  
Thus, the leaders of a country who had long appropriated the ancient history of the Welsh 
to assume the indigenous identity of Britons, rejected a Scot’s attempt to do the same.  
The implication was clear.  The English assumed a British identity on their own terms, 
shaped according to their national mythologies.  Altogether, the English at Westminster 
were keen to preserve their country’s independence, perceived glory, and hegemonic 
position in Britain.  Although James’ agenda was not without support, his attempt to 
forge a British nation pushed many MPs to reject all trappings of Britishness.  Indeed, the 
widespread rejection of the monarch’s use of Great Britain as his preferred appellation 
for England, Scotland, and Wales suggests a profound anxiety that informed their 
conduct.  The loudest voices among the English showed no inclination to become British 
in a way that would match James’ enthusiasm for union.102   
For the faction in the Commons determined to maintain English primacy in 
Britain, the Scots would need to enter an incorporating union whereby Scotland and 
England would form one political unit with one monarch and one parliament, presumably 
at Westminster.  As each of the king’s realms had different legal systems, they found it 
inconceivable that the two countries could become one unified political unit without a 
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change to Scotland’s legal system.  Also, an additional anxiety haunted them that forcing 
such a marriage of nations would reduce England’s stature as the presumed natural 
political and cultural leader in the British Isles.103  They looked to their own history and 
knew that England annexed Wales and subsequently replaced its own native legal system 
with English common law, ultimately completed with Henry VIII’s two Acts of Union in 
1536 and 1543.104  The Scots would adopt English laws and assimilate into a greater 
English culture, not unlike their perception of the Welsh experience.  In the subsequent 
generations, many Welsh, especially members of the elite, had attended English 
universities and pursued English professions, consequently identifying as English.  
During the union debate in the first few years of Jacobean rule in England, published 
treatises often referred to the Welsh and English as one people, conveniently overlooking 
Welsh speakers from the lower orders.  In one of his speeches, the king argued that Wales 
and England were the same country.105  For Sandys and like-minded MPs, the Welsh 
model became the exemplar of the perfect union, one based on English military victory.  
It was this sort of union that the nationalist faction wanted.  They sought an anglicized 
Britain wherein Scotland adopted the English common law and sent representatives to 
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Westminster, working within the political and cultural parameters of the English state.106  
English public officials and writers looked for precedents for a perfect union of two 
independent countries and could find none successful except by conquest, suggesting the 
challenge of amalgamating two kingdoms.107   
Excepting the aspect of subjugation, James originally sought a similar 
arrangement between his two realms, a unified British state replete with one parliament, 
privy council, system of law, and religion.  Eventually, however, unionists including the 
king realized such a total union was not achievable through negotiation.  Thus, they 
scaled back their expectations for union to a partial or less than perfect union.108  In the 
words of one contemporary observer, there was “nothing more hard to prove than a 
perfect union.”109  Scotland’s status as an independent country made it that much more 
difficult to achieve a perfect union, for English parliamentarians would have expected the 
dismantling of Scottish institutions, something that the Scots would not have permitted.  
Without an actual conquest as in the case of Wales, the English could not unilaterally 
bring Scotland into the English realm.  Although negotiation could have led to a perfect 
union, it would have likely taken an actual conquest to achieve the sort of total 
domination of Scotland as had been the case in Wales.110  Many English MPs expected 
no less than the total cultural and political assimilation of the Scottish territories into the 
English polity, making the northern country a mere geographical appendage akin to 
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Cornwall, and as a perfect union necessitated military subjugation, a perfect union came 
to mean annexation of a subjugated people with English domination its subsequent 
consequence.  This kind of union made sense to MPs, one modelled on the Welsh 
experience.111   
 When James realized that his idea of a perfect union was unacceptable to his MPs 
at Westminster, he decided to move gradually.  In 1604, he supported the proposals of a 
joint Scottish – English commission that proposed mutual naturalization and limited free 
trade between the two countries.  There would have been no unified British state.  
Nonetheless, Sandys and anti-union MPs objected, calling this plan an imperfect union, 
for the Scots would gain privileges of Englishmen without giving in kind.  Sandys 
represented the idea of English primacy in Britain.  Until the 1606/1607 Parliamentary 
session, when the debate erupted anew, James’ dream of union lay dormant save a few 
minor adjustments.  However, this initial debate not only drew the lines of contention, it 
also delimited the type of union most MPs would countenance.  If they were Britons, they 
made no mention of it, nor did they celebrate the Britishness that the king wished to 
foster.  Levack contends that anti-unionists wanted to preserve the unitary English state, 
and any union with Scotland meant that that country would incorporate into England, 
becoming an outlying province of it.112 
 In the 1604 parliamentary session, both sides of the union debate finally appeared 
to accept the notion of a so-called perfect union between Scotland and England.  
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However, such a conjoining of the two countries meant different things to each side of 
the debate.  The king envisaged an amicable union of equals.  The anti-unionist, 
nationalist faction, led by Sandys, wanted to ensure that the Scots would not receive the 
benefits of union without its responsibilities.  In that event, Sandys, Northampton, and 
Neville argued that Scotland would see no reason to enter a perfect union.  Sandys and 
like-minded MPs sought English domination, the sort of arrangement only practicable by 
way of military conquest.113  This divergence in objectives blurred the meaning of perfect 
union and put a stop to the positive progression towards union in that year.  Its 
significance lay with the insistence of many MPs that a British union, and thus indirectly, 
Britishness, remained Anglocentric.  The problem revolved around the sort of union that 
the king sought, and at this stage in the debate in 1604, the pro-unionists including the 
king and Bacon and the anti-unionists including Sandys defined the concept of union in 
contradictory terms, terms that reveal the meaning of Britishness and Englishness as the 
debate progressed.  The idea that the English would somehow transform into something 
less English led to widespread opposition to James’ British experiment.  When James 
acceded to the English throne in 1603, he wanted a so-called perfect union.  For him and 
his unionist supporters, perfecting the Union of the Crowns meant a full integration of the 
two countries, their laws, parliaments, churches, and economies.  Both countries would 
owe allegiance to the same monarch, and Scotland and England would form one unitary 
realm named Great Britain; the king wanted to establish a British national state.114  This 
sort of union of the two countries was not entirely dissimilar to that which Sandys and his 
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fellow anti-unionists could stomach; however, the king wanted the Scots to enjoy equal 
status with the English.   
 In changing the country’s name to Great Britain and adopting British symbols 
such as the new union flag and coins, James wanted to foster a British identity among the 
English and Scottish peoples.  Scottish parliamentarians in Edinburgh made clear that 
they would never allow a change to their country’s name, for they reasoned it had been 
part of their history for over a thousand years,115 nor would they give up their legal 
system.  Rather than an island-wide anglicization, James envisaged an Anglo-Scottish 
assimilation whereby the people of both countries would come to think themselves 
British.  In this way, they would call themselves Britons, or if not, then North Britons and 
South Britons.  Levack contended that James failed to understand that a national identity 
would not gain purchase among a population via a symbology imposed upon it.  He 
maintained that the English and Scots would have already needed to identify primarily 
with Britishness rather than their sense of belonging to England or Scotland before they 
would have embraced symbols that reflected Great Britain and its ideals.116  Though 
Levack’s premise appears valid in this case, it was not simply a matter of English 
hesitation to assume a British identity, as if James had been premature in the evolutionary 
process of national consciousness.  Rather, his efforts turned many MPs away from 
adopting a British identity.  As one English contemporary wrote, “A confusion of 
precedencyes would growe betwixt England and Scotland in the united name which being 
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now distinguished is out of the question.”117  The English were simply unprepared to 
relinquish their country’s predominant role in Britain or to allow a British identity to 
supersede their English sense of belonging.  If British is defined as a trans-national 
identity that spans the whole of Britain and all its peoples, for the anti-union MPs, that 
identity was English.  It was their expectation that the Scots, like the Welsh, would 
anglicize thereby assuming an English national identity that would eventually define 
Britons and thus Britishness.  Any political agreement that established a British nation 
that would lead to the diminution of England – its sovereignty and its regional privilege – 
was unacceptable to them.  It was this brand of Britishness that the Commons rejected.  
Although English MPs would have likely approved of the preservation of their 
Parliament, such an arrangement meant that Scotland and England would form the new 
Great Britain as equal partners.  English MPs could not envisage a union wherein 
England would be anything less than the dominant partner.  Only the situations with 
Wales and Ireland made sense to them.   
  In what became the end of the debate in 1604, James himself began to moderate 
his objectives, realizing that a union of equals was not entirely realistic.  However, he 
waited until 1607 to reveal his conciliatory side, telling the Commons that Scotland 
“would be as if you had got it by conquest, but such a conquest as may be cemented by 
love, the only sure subjection or friendship.”118  Continuing, almost in exasperation, the 
king asked, “Must they not be subjected to the laws of England and so with time become 
but as Cumberland and Northumberland and those other remote and northern shires?”  In 
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an apparent attempt to placate MPs, he told them, “You are to be the husband, they the 
wife; you conquerors, they as conquered, though not by the sword, but by the sweet and 
sure bond.”119  English intransigence had finally forced the Scottish king to assure 
Westminster parliamentarians of Scottish inferiority in a union of the two countries.  That 
was the Britishness they understood.  
                                                          




James’ Dream of Union Falters, 1607 
 
   
 1607 proved a watershed year for the debates concerning union with Scotland.  
Much of the political discourse illustrates the division that arose from James’ efforts to 
create a British union culminating in parliamentary indecision.1  The immediate source of 
that indecision seems to have originated in MPs’ concerns born of an inability to envision 
the legal mechanics of a political union with Scotland.  However, a strong emotional 
response coloured the debates and hinted at an undercurrent of national sentiment that 
was loath to lose historic notions of English primacy in the British Isles.  In the 1606-07 
parliamentary session, the divisions between crown and Parliament regarding the 
proposed union of the king’s realms remained intractable.  Although the Gunpowder 
Treason reflected religious dissension that nearly decapitated the governing elite at 
Westminster, its conspirators had also hoped to put an end to possible union between 
their country and Scotland.  The coup attempt’s failure to create a defensive unity of 
purpose between crown and Parliament underscores the depths of hostility in the 
Commons to James’ efforts to create a politically unified Great Britain.  In short, while 
anti-Scottish sentiment undoubtedly existed in early seventeenth-century England, the 
response of MPs went beyond the dislike of Scots they might have felt.  Rather, James’ 
inability, whether purposeful or inadvertent, to respond positively to English expectations 
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of kingship inflamed the relationship between monarch and Parliament, making James’ 
dream of political union untenable.   
Three thematic foci were direct consequences of James’ efforts to create a British 
union with England and Scotland, and they form the organizing basis for this chapter:  
First, the regard for country that contributed to the Gunpowder Plot in 1605 and its social 
and political consequences.  Second, the divisions that the Plot created between James 
and his Parliament when the king withdrew into his inner sanctum and surrounded 
himself with Scots, and finally, the king’s two consecutive speeches to Parliament in 
1607 culminating in him berating MPs for their refusal to approve the political union he 
desired.  From the time of the Gunpowder Plot to the king’s second speech in 1607, 
Parliamentary frustration with James’ lack of trust for his English subjects, and as an 
adjunct, the threat to English conceptions of their country’s place in Britain, dogged the 
union debate and encouraged parliamentarians to re-evaluate their sense of national self.  
Although these three thematic focal points imply political conflict between monarch and 
Parliament, evidence suggests a persistent cultural conflict that went beyond politics or 
Scotophobia.  Indeed, the inability of James and the Commons to find common ground in 
the union debate lay with English patriotic ideas regarding the belief in the intrinsic 
superiority of Englishness as a civilizing force.      
 
 
The Gunpowder Plot as a rejection of a collective British identity.  
 The Gunpowder Treason resides in the annals of history as a Catholic plot to blow 
up the Westminster Parliament, and indeed anger stemming from the legal restrictions on 
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the practice of Catholicism provided the basis for the conspiracy, animating Robert 
Catesby to assemble a team of assassins beginning in the spring of 1604.2  Although 
Catesby died in the aftermath of the attempt and never made it to trial, his co-conspirators 
maintained that his resentment from decades of anti-Catholic persecution acted as his 
prime motivation, driving him to exact revenge against the Protestant government.  His 
recruitment to the plot drew from his anger, and his message was one of righting injustice 
couched in an apocalyptic perception of the future of English Catholicism.  In 1604, 
when he approached Thomas Winter, Catesby appealed to Winter’s love of faith and 
country.  Catesby knew that Winter had considered moving to the continent for religious 
reasons.  The ringleader emphasized “howe necessary it was nott to forsake our country 
... but to deliver her from servitud where she remained.”3  Catesby purportedly told 
Winter that destroying Parliament was symbolically significant, for it was the place from 
which the injustices against Catholicism had been issued.  Guy Fawkes’ testimony after 
his arrest reflected those same sentiments.4  According to Robert Winter, Thomas’ 
brother, Catesby expressed a similar concern for English Catholics a year later when the 
ringleader recruited him to the cause:  “all Catholique estates were all redy desperate, and 
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that he well knewe ere the Parlyament ended, there would be soche lawes made, as 
should bringe all Catholiques within premunire at the Leaste.”5   Revenge seems to have 
been a consensual current that ran through the personal objectives of each plotter.  
Contempt for the king and hatred for Parliament are a recurring motif in the testimony of 
the conspirators.  A few days after his arrest, Fawkes declared that the razing of the 
House of Lords would have simply counted as justice served.6  Suggesting 
disgruntlement with anti-Catholic policies as a fundamental motivating factor for the 
conspiracy, one of the plotters, Robert Keyes, testified after his arrest that the 
conspirators believed that after the explosion and the ensuing chaos, “all the Catholiques 
and discontented persons would take there [sic] partes and proclaime the lady Elizabeth 
being next heire.”7  When the court passed his death sentence at the end of his trial, 
Keyes defiantly declared that he was prepared to die “and for this cause rather then [sic] 
for another.”8  As the group’s ringleader, Catesby took the initiative to start what he 
hoped would end in widespread rebellion, and as a Catholic in a Protestant land, he 
assumed that other co-religionists shared his frustration with the political establishment’s 
refusal to lift restrictions on Catholic practice.  
Despite the religious impetus behind the conspiracy, an undercurrent of national 
sentiment helped drive the plot, demonstrating the potential political force that the union 
debate unleashed.  When a search party discovered thirty-six barrels of gunpowder 
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hidden in a vault under the House of Lords in early November 1605, the country was just 
hours from losing its governing body and leadership.  Along with parliamentarians lost to 
the explosion, James, Queen Anne, Princes Henry and Charles, nobility, and church 
leaders would likely have died.9  While England narrowly escaped a political catastrophe 
of unprecedented measure, its effect on the union debate proved indirect but significant.  
When authorities first apprehended Guy Fawkes early on November 5, 1605, he 
reportedly told them that the conspirators wanted “to prevent the Union that was sought 
to be published at this parliament.”10  Despite the conspiracy’s Catholic basis, an 
undercurrent of anti-union sentiment runs through the testimonies of several of its 
survivors.  
Shortly after his arrest, Fawkes testified that plotters believed that their efforts 
would garner the support of segments of the English population unhappy at the prospect 
of union with Scotland.  In her assessment of the motives behind the Gunpowder Plot, 
Jenny Wormald argued that anti-Scottish bigotry figured prominently in the conspiracy.  
Certainly, writings and testimony recorded before and after the planned explosion support 
her contention that contempt for the Scots in London played a role in the coup attempt.  
To reach her conclusion, Wormald traced the roots of this Scotophobia to 1603 and 
James’ accession to the English throne, taking evidence from a letter Fawkes wrote in 
which he attacked the Scots who came south with the king and subsequently pushed their 
way into court thereby replacing Englishmen.  As a consequence, many observers 
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thought James had treated English peers dismissively.11  Although Wormald emphasized 
the anti-Scottish sentiment in Fawkes’ letter, she attributed his disparate criticisms to one 
generic Scotophobia without accounting for nuanced variation in his complaint.  More 
specifically, the plotters took aim at James’ union project and his apparent disregard for 
English expectations of remaining the unquestioned predominant nationality within the 
English government.  In his discourse, Fawkes objected to James’ appointment of Scots 
to the best positions with the most prestige, offices that disgruntled Englishmen 
considered their birthright.  In particular, Fawkes and his cohort took umbrage with the 
political power that James gave to several Scotsmen, leaving many English subjects 
answerable to Scottish superiors.  Indeed, their grievances were more national than local, 
more about the state of the nation than of the court.  For most plotters the connection to 
the court was likely distant, if at all extant, revealing a concern that proved more 
theoretical than practical.12  The plotters were not MPs, nor were they courtiers; as such, 
they would not have come into direct competition with the king’s retinue of fellow 
countrymen, indicating discontent with the king’s attempt to integrate the peoples of his 
two kingdoms; if union meant an integration of Scots into the governing mechanism of 
England, many of his English subjects rejected it.  As particularly egregious examples of 
                                                          
11 Wormald, “Gunpowder, Treason, and Scots,” 157-58. 
12 Guy Fawkes, “The Grievances of the English Peers Apart from the Catholics,” in Guy Fawkes in Spain: 
The “Spanish Treason” in Spanish Documents, ed., Albert J. Loomie, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Research, Special Supplement No. 9 (London, 1971), 62. It is possible that individual members of the plot 
felt a close personal empathy for those Englishmen who might have lost political standing when the king’s 
perceived preference for Scots allegedly led him to select them for positions of authority. Thomas Percy, 
for example, was a gentleman with known connections to the court. Indeed, the familial link of one 
conspirator, Francis Tresham, likely prompted him to send his brother-in-law and Catholic peer, Lord 
Monteagle, an anonymous letter warning him away from Parliament and thus almost certain death. There 
is, however, no indication in Fawkes’ letter that he was personally connected to government officials and 
would therefore have had reason to feel personally aggrieved. See Nicholls, “Strategy and Motivation in the 
Gunpowder Plot,” 789, 791.  
74 
 
the king’s anti-English proclivities, Fawkes noted that various Scots had gained 
leadership roles in Wales and the town of Berwick.  Many of the men closest to the king 
in advisory roles were Scots.  The Chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster was a Scot as 
was the Captain of the Guard, a man who released 100 Englishmen from duty.  Even in 
religious matters, two Scots outranked Englishmen when the king gave bishoprics to his 
fellow countrymen.  Fawkes also complained that the king’s apparent favouritism for his 
fellow Scots at court allowed them to quarrel with and antagonize their English 
counterparts, noting that many peers did not like them for it.  However, the installation of 
Scots in English positions of power provoked much of his anger.13  Certainly, the plotters 
left no indication of a common British identity shared with Scots. 
When given the opportunity, Fawkes voiced his anti-unionism directly to the 
king.  Brought to James’ bedchamber for interrogation after his arrest, Fawkes 
emphasized his fellow conspirators’ contempt for the king’s efforts to bring the whole of 
Britain into one political union, proclaiming to James’ Scottish courtiers that he would 
have liked the planned explosion to “have blown them back again into Scotland.”14  
Though overtly anti-Scottish, there was more to his retort than direct bigotry.  In one of 
his confessions, Fawkes claimed that there had been an anti-union proclamation that the 
conspirators were going to use to rally the English people to their cause.  Upon the 
abduction of Lady Elizabeth, the plotters had planned to issue a “protest agaynst the 
union, and in noe sort to have meddled with Religion therein.”  Upon understating the 
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role of religion in their planned coup attempt, he emphasized that the proclamation would 
have been made in the name of Lady Elizabeth.15  Assuming that Fawkes spoke the truth, 
it is difficult to tell if the plotters wanted simply to end all possibility of union between 
England and Scotland, or if this proclamation was a cynical attempt to garner the support 
of an otherwise unsympathetic population.  By this point in James’ reign, the conspirators 
belonged to a minority of alienated Catholics; most of their co-religionists were content 
with managing the official proscriptions against their faith.16  With so little popular 
support, the raw practicalities of the plotters’ objectives demanded additional help, for as 
Fawkes conceded, in London “they had noe forces.”17  They must have foreseen the 
necessity of generating support for their cause, and their purported plan to draw upon the 
union debate suggests widespread anti-union sentiment in the English population.  
Proclaiming Lady Elizabeth queen demonstrates two things.  First, the conspirators 
accepted the Scottish Stuart line of succession and thought the English people did as well.  
Second, at a time when the governing elite would have largely perished in the explosion, 
the young Elizabeth Stuart would have provided a national emblem of stability and 
legitimacy.  Wormald maintained that James’ kingship “touched on a very raw nerve.  
James might have all the advantages of being adult, male, and Protestant.  He had, in 
English eyes, the irredeemable deformity of being a Scot.”18  Fawkes’ admission of a call 
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to arms reinforces the notion that anti-union sentiment stemmed largely from degrees of 
national pride rather than crude anti-Scottish sentiment.      
At the start of James’ reign, early modern English national sentiment rested on the 
unmalleable notion of English cultural superiority, a perspective of themselves which 
helped fuel the sense of their country’s position as the rightful hegemon of Briton.  While 
thwarted, the Gunpowder Treason, nonetheless, reverberated through the emotional 
landscape of London.  Nicolo Molin, the Venetian ambassador, wrote of the uneasiness 
that permeated the capital city, and the apparent exclusionary national feeling the plot 
generated:  
The city is in great uncertainty; Catholics fear heretics, and vice-versa; both are 
armed; foreigners live in terror of their houses being sacked by the mob that is 
convinced that some, if not all, foreign Princes are at the bottom of the plot. The 
King and Council have very prudently thought it advisable to quiet the popular 
feeling by issuing a proclamation, in which they declare that no foreign Sovereign 
had any part in the conspiracy. God grant this be sufficient, but as it is everyone 
has, his own share of alarm.19  
 
The picture Molin paints of London is one that falls just short of panic.  In fact, the fear 
born of the immensity of the conspiracy proves palpable.  That the anxiety connects to 
disparate foreign groups suggests an insecurity that emphasizes national difference. 
When the authorities discovered the Gunpowder Plot, James had already reigned in 
England for over two years, but there had been little indication that the English 
considered the Scots compatriots, nor was there an adjunct increase in support for a 
British union or identity.   
Slightly more than a month after authorities thwarted the Gunpowder Plot, the 
depths of the plotters’ anti-Scottish feeling came to light.  In the following excerpt from a 
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dispatch to Venice from December 22, 1605, Molin reports the apparent nationalist 
impulses that, at least in part, drove the conspiracy’s objectives: 
Lately among the prisoners’ effects a paper has been found, containing the list of 
all houses inhabited by Scots. When asked as to the meaning of this the prisoners 
said that it was intended, after the explosion of the mine, to massacre all the 
Scottish in this country, for they could not submit to the share which their natural 
enemies now had in the government.20    
 
A little more than two years after James’ accession, the Scots remained – at least 
according to the plotters – “natural enemies,” suggesting that some of the frustration with 
the king stemmed from his desire to rule the two countries as national equals.  Although 
religious frustration provided the impetus for the plotters’ desire to destroy England’s 
ruling apparatus, English nationalistic fervour – and its accompanying xenophobia – 
undoubtedly increased the dimensions of their plan to eradicate the Scottish national 
community from London.  Certainly, planning for such a massacre indicates the existence 
in some quarters of hatred for Scots resident in the capital city.  However, members of the 
conspiracy clearly believed that the nationalistic underpinnings of their plan would find 
purchase among the English population.21  In some respects, Scots faced the same 
xenophobia that confronted other non-English residents in London in the aftermath of the 
Gunpowder Plot.  When word made the rounds that the plotters meant to subject Scots to 
especial brutality, many of James’ subjects from the northern kingdom reacted 
accordingly, revealing their fear of the English born of widespread anti-Scot sentiment.  
In his dispatch from December 1605, Molin wrote:  
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The publication of this news has increased the hatred between the two nations, 
and rendered them quite irreconcilable.  Many Scots are thinking of returning 
home, for they fear that some day a general massacre may take place.22  
 
Whatever notions that James had regarding the efficacy of political union between the 
two kingdoms, the already extant Union of the Crowns had not mitigated the cultural 
divisions or, as Molin’s report illustrates, the tendency to see members of the 
neighbouring nation as a threatening foreign element. 
The Gunpowder Plot indicates that after nearly three years of the Union of the 
Crowns, evidence of an inclusive British identity whereby English and Scots shared a 
common national purpose remained elusive.  Among the English there was the 
impression that Scots were making economic advances at the cost of local residents, an 
impression that transformed into overtly bitter anti-Scots sentiment.23  The following 
libel makes reference to rumours of a goldmine in Scotland while exemplifying the 
common English understanding of impoverished Scots who migrated south with James 
only to abscond with English wealth: 
A Myene of Gold some say there’s found 
In Scotland; that’s a wonder. 
To see noe money above ground 
And yett to fynde some under.24 
The stereotype of the crafty Scot out to fleece unsuspecting English subjects formed a 
recurring motif in ballads of the time and shows English vulnerability and anger 
prompted by the Scottish presence in London, the symbolism of the Union of the Crowns 
notwithstanding.      
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Though the existence of anti-Scottish feeling in early modern England is well 
known,25 the Gunpowder Plot reflects a synthesis of three facets of the evolving 
constellation of English national identity vis-à-vis James’ accession to power in the 
southern kingdom:  a rejection of James’ reign, Scotophobia, and a rejection of a British 
union of national equals.  Significantly, the Gunpowder Plot provides evidence of an 
English national sentiment that responded to the Scottish presence in concert with the 
early years of James’ reign in England.  That national sentiment rejected James’ ideals 
regarding a British identity.  However, the conspirators’ opposition to union was more 
than Scotophobia.  Rather, their efforts came as much from wounded English pride as it 
did from base prejudice.   
 
Divisions the plot created between James and his Parliament.  
 Although scholars look to the Gunpowder Plot as a Catholic conspiracy against a 
Protestant political power structure, they overlook its value as a tool to gauge the English 
response to their Scottish ruler.  For the union debate and ultimately the evolving 
perception of English national identity, the Gunpowder Plot proved consequential.  It 
drove James to surround himself with Scots, a decision which further alienated him from 
Members of Parliament.  This alienation worked against him at Westminster in his quest 
for union and will be further investigated in the last section of this chapter.   
 The sheer audacity of the plot pushed James to look inward at his own personal 
safety.  When Molin met the king on November 23, 1605, James reportedly pointed to his 
son Charles and declared:  “This poor boy’s innocence and that of the Prince and of 
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others has had more power with God than the perfidious malignity of men.”26  
Unsurprisingly, he was focused on the enormity of the crime, telling Molin that had the 
conspirators succeeded, “thirty thousand persons would have perished at a stroke, the city 
would have been sacked, and the rich would have suffered more than the poor; in short, 
the world would have seen a spectacle so terrible and terrifying that its like has never 
been heard of.”27  The emotional effect of the Gunpowder Plot on James led him to 
surround himself with the only people he thought he could trust:  Scots.  Molin took note, 
writing on November 21 that as one of the conspirators “underwent the most excruciating 
torture” in the Tower, the crisis had cleaved Scots and English apart: 
The King had let it be known that he wished to have the Scots about his person, as 
he has not much confidence in the English, who know this and are greatly 
annoyed. The King is in terror; he does not appear nor does he take his meals in 
public as usual. He lives in the innermost rooms, with only Scotchmen about him. 
The Lords of the Council also are alarmed and confused by the plot itself and the 
King's suspicions.28  
 
For all their apparent abhorrence of Scots, Fawkes and his men had ensured their 
predominance in James’ court.   As early as 1604, the Bedchamber had already become 
an irritant, inciting political fears that surpassed simple anti-Scottish prejudice.     
As in 1604, debate surrounding union overshadowed the parliamentary session of 
1606-1607, and once again the loudest voices in the Commons staunchly opposed union.  
Much of that opposition centred on the perceived influence in England of Scottish 
courtiers and the rightful role of England in Britain, concerns intensified by the recent 
Gunpowder Plot and increased mistrust between James and MPs.  After the coup attempt, 
there was no groundswell of support in Parliament for his union project.  In February 
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1607 – after much delay – the Union Commission presented its proposal in the lower 
house for consideration, a legislative move that seems to have precipitated Sir 
Christopher Piggott’s denunciation of Scots courtiers in the House of Commons.  For his 
efforts, MPs censured him and sent him to the Tower.  Though his speech was extreme, it 
indicates the protracted nature of discomfort with the perceived Scottish influence on the 
king and by extension the concept of union.29  In support of union, Bacon refuted Piggott, 
contending that despite “some persons of quality about His Majesty’s person here at 
court,” the number of Scots resident in England was “extremely small.”30   Despite 
Bacon’s speech, the fear of Scottish influence on England’s king inflamed English 
sensibilities and resentment.  As Wormald noted, James had been unsuccessful 
convincing MPs of the need for a British union, but maintaining a Scottish Bedchamber 
proved nevertheless a feat in the face of staunch parliamentary opposition.  She argued 
that  
seen from the English point of view, it was a menace and a block to English 
aspirations; and a king primarily anxious to please his English subjects would not 
have created it.  That the political heartbeat of the English establishment was 
wholly Scottish is, in British, or at least Anglo-Scottish terms, a revealing 
comment on the political balance which the king really wanted.31   
 
Unfortunately for James, his cherished union project increasingly meant Scottish 
domination in the eyes of Westminster MPs.  Parliamentary opposition to union, like 
changing the country’s name, often belied a “‘coded’ attack” against Scottish influence at 
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the court.32  In 1607, Sandys and several other MPs proposed a perfect union with 
Scotland.  He was dedicated to preserving a unitary state; from the opposition’s 
perspective, the only acceptable union with Scotland would have meant subjugation of 
the Scots and the erasure of its political and cultural institutions.   
James slowly began to realize that the Essex faction in the Commons, resentful 
for its loss of power in court to the Bedchamber, wielded its influence to garner 
opposition to union.  Yet, another symbolically rich demonstration of James’ cultural and 
political insensitivity occurred in March 1607 when the Scottish Robert Carr publicly 
replaced the English Philip Herbert, earl of Montgomery, as the king’s favourite, thus 
adding to the already heavy Scottish influence surrounding the king.33  Even members of 
the Privy Council found they needed a formal audience with James to meet with him, an 
affront when Scottish members of the Bedchamber had free access to the king, a situation 
that caused much anxiety among English MPs.  So great was the sense of grievance in the 
Commons that the Bedchamber began to dominate MPs’ relationship with the king to the 
point that it became a stumbling block to union, not least for the distrust it created.  In 
1607, James’ appointment of one of his Scottish Bedchamber advisors, Sir George Home, 
earl of Dunbar, to head a new border commission gave Home dictatorial powers over 
Englishmen in the borders region, a move that divested the English of political power in 
the extreme north of the country.34  A defiant pattern arose in James’ behaviour vis-à-vis 
the Commons.  Instead of making an effort to ameliorate the situation, he simply 
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conducted his court as if the MPs and their concerns about the disproportionate influence 
of Scots simply did not matter.  In fact, the controversy surrounding the Bedchamber had 
increasingly fuelled opposition to the king’s plan for union.  Unfortunately for his dreams 
of an Anglo-Scottish union, he either did not care or did not realize that the exclusive 
presence of Scots in the Bedchamber infuriated English MPs to the point of distraction, 
which in turn ensured “mutual distrust” between James and the Commons.35          
  
James, perfect union, and English notions of cultural superiority. 
 On the heels of the coup attempt, the Anglo-Scottish union gave way to the 
dimensions of the conspiracy, deferring parliamentary consideration of political union 
with Scotland in the midst of heightened nativist tension.36  Nonetheless, the inability to 
bridge political gaps after the bomb threat speaks to the chasm separating English 
parliamentarians from their Scottish king.  Even prior to the November 5 assassination 
attempt, tensions in England between James and English MPs had reached a slow boil.  
In October, a few weeks before the murderous attempt against Parliament, the Venetian 
ambassador wrote: 
The question of the Union will, I am assured, be dropped; for his Majesty is now 
well aware that nothing can be effected, both sides displaying such obstinacy that 
an accommodation is impossible; and so his Majesty is resolved to abandon the 
question for the present, in the hope that time may consume the ill-humours.37      
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Galloway maintained that the proposed Anglo-Scottish union came up against “an 
enormous residue of misunderstanding and ill-will” in the Commons, ultimately killing 
it.38   
Unfortunately for James, in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot, his desire for 
Union ran into two complementary challenges:  Parliamentary frustration with the king’s 
lack of trust for his English subjects and the perceived threat to their conceptions of their 
country’s place in Britain, which reinforced the perception of a Scottish takeover of the 
crown and thus unequal union.  In the following excerpt from a satirical ballad of the 
time, the so-called beggarly Scots face ridicule for their transformation into well-dressed 
courtiers, presumably at the cost of Englishmen: 
Thy belt that was made of a white leather thonge 
Which thow & thy father ware so longe 
Are turn’d to hangers of velvet stronge  
With golde & pearle embroydred amonge. 
 
Thy cloake which was made of a home spun thread 
Which thow wast wonte to flinge on thy bed 
Is turnd into a skarlet red 
With golden laces aboute thee spread.39 
 
While the libel tapped into the widespread assumption that the Scots were supplanting 
Englishmen at court, the anger reflected the growing unease that James failed to identify 
with Anglocentric governance.  In December 1605, Molin reported the effects of the 
king’s propensity to favour his fellow Scots: 
All this annoys the English, who cannot endure that his Majesty should show so 
much more confidence in the Scottish than in themselves. His Majesty is aware of 
this, and on this account he has not accepted a bodyguard of Scottish light horse.40      
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According to Molin, James took heed of the concerns of his English MPs when they 
demonstrated against his apparent disregard for their national sensibilities, something he 
repeated in 1607 when he addressed Parliament at Whitehall.  For his efforts, James 
found the Commons nevertheless disinclined to approve his Anglo-Scottish union, a 
testament to the anxieties such a political arrangement generated. 
 In an attempt to persuade the Commons to approve the union with Scotland, 
James delivered a speech at Westminster on March 31, 1607.  Unfortunately, his message 
proved rather contradictory.  He tried to reason with them but made clear that the English 
would need to compromise with the Scots, something they were not prepared to do.  The 
king began his address stating that he wanted “a perfect Union of laws and Persons and 
such a Naturalizing as may make One Body of both Kingdoms under me your king.”  He 
told the MPs that the union would be as one achieved through conquest but one 
“cemented by love.”  As king, he found it impossible to rule over two kingdoms when 
“the One the greater, the other a less, a richer and a poorer.”  He wanted a union with 
unus Rex, unus grex, and una lex.  However, James did not want one unitary state 
whereby Scotland would become little more than a regional variant akin to 
Northumberland, demonstrating impatience with MPs who refused to countenance the 
thought of Scotland retaining some of its customs and privileges in the same way that the 
English insisted on keeping their own.  He called the common law the best legal system 
in the world, but that it was time to clear it of “rust.”  He criticized its reliance on 
precedents and the possibility of the harm judges could do, not to mention the uncertainty 
of a legal system based upon case law.  As such, the English should expect to reform 
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their laws, for if the Scots were expected to give up their laws for the English system, 
they would rightfully expect the English to reform the common law to make it clear and 
“better.”41       
 On April 28, Sandys offered a rejoinder to the king’s March speech.  As he had in 
1604, he made the case for perfect union, one that meant a unitary state.  He had 
obviously spent much time contemplating the problem, making clear that a perfect union 
would be unworkable unless the Scots would become subject to English law and 
jurisdiction.  He left no indication that the English would yield any of their own traditions 
or practices.  It was for the Scots to change.  Sandys argued that  
it is not Unus Grex untill the whole doe ioyne in makeing Lawes to governe the 
whole; for it is fitt and iust, that every man doe ioyne in makeing that which shall 
binde and governe him; and because every man cannot be personally present, 
therefore a Representative body is made to performe that Service.42   
 
For Sandys, there could be no single law for the whole of Britain until there was only one 
parliament with the implication that the Scots would need to abandon their own.43          
By the spring of 1607, the Stuart king had had enough of Parliament’s 
prevarication on the topic of union and summoned MPs to Whitehall.  A sense of 
parliamentary resistance to James’ desire for a politically unified Great Britain appears in 
the angry tone the king used to deliver his speech on May 2.  On that date, Members of 
Parliament joined Lords and Bishops of the Upper House at Whitehall, an assembly that 
indicates the gravity of the occasion.44  His English reign had entered its fourth year, and 
despite his express desire, James’ dream of a union between his native Scotland and the 
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English kingdom had bogged down in parliamentary indecision and rancour.  While 
James’ exasperation is palpable, the source of it reveals mismatched expectations of king 
and MPs stemming largely from a Parliament with a strong sense of its place within the 
nation.  James’ speech to the Commons and Lords reads as much as remonstration as 
supplication and hints at the stubborn opposition to his political objective, his tone 
oscillating from incredulous to antagonistic and even rather threatening.45  That it came 
only slightly over a month after his March 31 address also indicates his frustration with 
the lack of progress towards reaching his political objective.46   
 James started his speech in a calm and measured tone, speaking in metaphorical 
terms.  Calling himself a “Sower” who plants seeds and waits for them to grow and take 
root, the king informed Parliament that he intended to prune away brambles and weeds so 
as to allow the plant of union to grow.  His metaphoric language indicates that the debate 
had hung up on superfluous detritus, and he would clear the channels for a forthright 
discussion.47  Yet the king wasted little time conveying his intentions, referencing his 
previous address and revealing both the lack of progress in constructing a union and his 
frustration:   
For my Part, I can find no Symptoms or Signs in the Lower House, by 
which I may misjudge them, but that they will proceed in the same Course 
of particular Preparation, that they began in:  As for the Upper House, 
there hath been no Word spoken of the Matter since your last Meeting.48    
 
In fact, the king devoted a disproportionate amount of his speech to the matter of perfect 
union, his language hinting at the conflict and political controversy that that term had 
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inspired.  Engaging in linguistic acrobatics, James acknowledged “that some have 
interpreted my Words, as expressing a Desire and Proposition of a perfect Union,” but he 
rejected that idea.  What he wanted was “an absolute and full union, but not a perfect 
union.”49  He rejected the call for a commission to study the practicality of a perfect union 
as “foolish,” and warned that he would never permit such a body to form.  Referencing an 
anecdote about Henry VIII, James suggested his proposal should already take the form of 
law.  He rejected the notion that he sought a flawed political arrangement:  “It is merely 
idle and frivolous, to conceive that any imperfect Union is desired, or can be granted.”50  
Further to his point, he argued that the union had already occurred, casting it as a natural 
consequence of his royal condition:   
It is already a perfect Union in me, the Head.  If you wanted a Head, that is me, 
your King over you all; or if you were of yourselves no Body; then you had 
Reason to say, it were unperfect; but it is now perfect in my Title and Descent, 
though it be not an accomplisht and full union.51   
 
James’ perspective of his place in Britain reflects the Two Bodies theory, especially the 
king’s view of himself as “a head to its body or a husband to his wife.”52  Comparing the 
union to a fully formed child that had not grown to adulthood, James told the assembled 
parliamentarians that it would “gather Strength and Perfection by Time,” emphasizing the 
natural state of a union between Scotland and England but also betraying concern with 
the concept of perfect union.  About midway through the king’s speech, his tone became 
increasingly one of exasperation.  He reminded his audience that when he first ascended 
the throne, he proposed a commission, but “this whole body drew back,” put the brakes 
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on the proposal, and found so many ways to hinder its formation that the idea of union 
ultimately foundered.53  James’ retreat from the concept of perfect union is notable for 
two reasons.  First, it implies a realization on the king’s part that he framed the argument 
in his March speech in a strategically inept manner.  Second, it suggests a profound 
discomfort among Members of Parliament with a union of equal countries in Britain. 
 Near its conclusion, his speech rose to a crescendo, revealing an anger born of 
frustration.  The king must have realized that his power proved less than absolute and that 
he faced the counterintuitive reality that the English were rejecting an expansion of legal 
sovereignty over the whole of Britain. 
I am your King:  I am placed to govern you, and shall answer for your Errors:  I 
am a Man of Flesh and Blood, and have my Passions and Affections as other 
Men: I pray you, do not too far move me to do that which my Power may tempt 
me unto … tempt not the Patience of your Prince; … and make not all you have 
done, frustrate.54 
 
If anyone recognized the irony of the king comparing himself to “other men” while using 
the “Power” of his royal self to threaten, they left no record of it for posterity.  The Stuart 
monarch’s confused perspective at the end of his speech underscores the imprecision of 
the language used to describe the union he so wanted.  On this day, James could no 
longer contain his exasperation.  While his speeches often displayed a distinct 
“petulance,”55 one historian has called James’ demeanour on this occasion more a matter 
of “extreme anger,”56 possibly stemming from the king’s belief that the Commons was 
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“barren by preconceived Opinions.”57  Four years into his English kingship, the 
parliamentarians at Westminster had still thwarted his plan for a united kingdom of Great 
Britain.  However, this passage with its veiled threat demonstrates a low point in the 
relationship between James and Parliament.  It further illustrates the discomfort that the 
proposed union of the two countries caused English parliamentarians.  This chapter 
suggests that opposition in the Commons to political union with Scotland stemmed from 
English discomfort with a possible loss of their country’s hegemony within the British 
Isles.  Furthermore, the desire to maintain that regional dominance reveals the English 
perspective of themselves as a people.       
 In her defence of the Stuart monarch, Wormald might have inadvertently hinted at 
a possible source of parliamentary resistance.  She questioned the belief widespread 
among historians that James had to re-fashion himself into an English king, rejecting the 
assumption that a Scottish king would have surely failed as monarch of England.  Rather 
than thinking of James I as manifestly different from James VI, Wormald contended that 
the Stuart king never lost sight of his Scottish kingship, his Scottish friends, and his 
Scottish origins.  Indeed, she suggested that James’ efficacy as king of England stemmed 
from his Scottishness and points to the political, religious, and social tensions of 
Elizabeth I’s and Charles I’s reigns to underscore the relatively pacific interim of 
Jacobean rule.  Although anti-Scottish sentiment fuelled James’ opposition and left an 
indelible taint on his reputation, Wormald believed his nationality proved his “very great 
advantage.”58  However, in her article, Wormald examined James’ kingship in toto, up to 
his death in 1625.  She also began her article by rejecting Lawrence Stone’s blunt 
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characterization of the English dislike of James.59  Nonetheless, Wormald examined 
James’ ability to rule, and while she acknowledged the anti-Scottish prejudice of English 
parliamentarians, she rejected the notion that such intolerance prevented James from 
successfully ruling England.  However, examining James’ reign in its entirety glosses the 
reasons that English parliamentarians opposed his primary objective of union after his 
accession to England’s throne.  Though Wormald dismissed Stone’s appraisal of English 
bigotry, such bias seems to have played a role in the manner with which the Commons 
resisted the king’s pressure to create a politically unified Britain.  For some in England, 
this vision of James confirmed their negative ideas about their Scottish neighbours to the 
north.60  To add to those preconceived notions of Scottishness, the king’s decision to 
allow only Scots near him at court in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot alienated 
parliamentarians all the more and added to political disunity, a fragmented sense of 
national identity negotiated in ballads and on stage.61   
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As with other literary sources of the period, the potential for an Anglo-Scottish 
union with all its immediate controversies and potential consequences left an indelible 
impression on Shakespeare’s drama.  In his Macbeth, the playwright revealed, if 
inadvertently, the English notion of cultural superiority vis-à-vis the Scots, one that 
arguably informed parliamentary resistance to union.  The playwright would have known 
of the potential legal ramifications for casting a negative depiction of Scotland and its 
people.  Indeed, with the expectation of James’ accession to the English throne, 
Shakespeare removed the Scottish Jamy and his guttural, indecipherable language from 
Henry V when it went to print in 1600.  As Shakespeare wrote Macbeth – the so-called 
Scottish play – in 1606, he must have known of the scandal that befell the authors of 
Eastward Ho! for their mockery of Scotsmen.  In other words, Shakespeare likely wrote 
Macbeth with a discerning eye towards the potential danger that awaited anyone foolish 
enough to stage drama demeaning of Scots.62  That said, English cultural superiority 
seeps into the plot and its carefully managed portrayal of Scottish characters and a culture 
long considered inherently inferior.  Macbeth is set against an untamed, violent Scottish 
backdrop, seemingly undergoing improvement via English cultural cues.  Duncan rejects 
Gaelic tanistry for primogeniture, naming his eldest son Prince of Cumberland, thus 
emulating the English custom of designating the male heir to the throne the Prince of 
Wales.63  At the play’s end, when that heir, Malcolm, returns from his exile in the 
English court, he proclaims his assembled thanes “earls, the first that ever Scotland / In 
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such an honour nam’d.”64  The playwright thus anglicized Scottish practices, imposing 
English customs on the Scots.65  The scene evokes James’ generous bestowal of titles, but 
more significantly, it suggests English civility as an improvement upon Scottish 
practice.66         
For James, as for other lowland Scots, the Gaelic highlanders lived a primitive 
existence, one he thought needed correction.  In Macbeth, Shakespeare’s portrayal of 
uncivilized Scottish behaviour likely avoided the unfortunate predicament of insulting his 
Scottish king, for the dramatist set his eleventh-century plot in regions of seventeenth-
century Scotland that lowland Scots still considered primitive.  Nonetheless, the 
dramatist’s portrayal of Scottish culture likely struck his English audiences as Scottish 
civilization writ large, affirming the superiority of English cultural mores.67  As such, 
while Duncan and Malcolm adopt English aristocratic practices, Macbeth transforms 
from a loyal thane fighting the rebellious Macdonwald in the Gaelic Western Isles to a 
murderous traitor who commits regicide.68  In effect, the eponymous character becomes 
Gaelicized concurrent to Malcolm’s process of Anglicization.  When Macbeth seeks 
guidance from the “wither’d and wild”69 weird sisters, he has not only fallen prey to his 
own wild and savage instincts, he likely reaffirmed in the minds of English theatregoers 
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the sort of depravity they would have expected beyond the bounds of English civility.70  
As Malcolm and his English forces return from the English and explicitly Christian court, 
Macbeth calls them “epicures,” transforming a mark of civility into a pejorative.71  Not 
incidentally, when Malcolm, fresh from the English court, assumes the Scottish crown, 
the audience witnessed a symbolic scene wherein English civility and its accompanying 
Christianity triumph symbolically over Scottish barbarity.72      
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James, the Ancient Constitution, and English Sentiment 
 
 
 That English Parliamentarians resisted the political union of James’ dreams was 
clear.  Yet the grounds for that resistance proved crucial to English national identity in 
the first nine years of Stuart rule in the southern kingdom.  Parliament’s rejections of 
union constituted a response to the king’s Scottish nationality and to his vision of himself 
atop a political hierarchy that saw England and Scotland as equal partners within a British 
union, notions that ran counter to parliamentary expectations of English hegemony within 
the British Isles.  In effect, James reversed the power dynamic between crown and 
Parliament and consequently debased the notion that the English held of themselves as an 
elect people.  Despite the near catastrophe of the Gunpowder Plot and the presumptive 
need to cohere as one island nation, many English parliamentarians could not suppress 
their misgivings about creating a British union.  Questions remain regarding the source of 
parliamentary resistance to James’ proposed political union of the two kingdoms in 
Britain.  What was it about the idea of a Great Britain that caused Parliament to defer 
action on the proposal for years?  What were the theoretical underpinnings of that 
resistance?  For a country that had long thought itself synonymous with the whole of 
Britain, bringing the northern half of the island under the auspices of Westminster might 
have struck some as an obvious move.  Nonetheless, English MPs rejected the king’s 
objectives for three reasons, each subsequent to the previous.  First, James’ vision of 
himself as monarch ran counter English practice.  Second, MPs quickly grew frustrated 
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with James’ reversal of the Elizabethan power dynamic between crown and Parliament, 
consequently driving them to look to the common law and their mythical ancient 
constitution as an alternative locus of national sovereignty.  Finally, the friction between 
the Scottish king and perceived manifestations of English tradition and culture prompted 
a far more exclusive, narrowly-defined perception of Englishness, a national sentiment 
that rested on the conviction that equated the ancient constitution with civility.  It was a 
highly complex perception of the national self that not only displayed an uneasy 
relationship with the notion of Britishness; English identity nearly precluded it.  The 
English accepted British only so long as the term denoted English and implied English 
hegemonic superiority. 
 
James’ vision of himself as monarch ran counter to English practice.  
 When the union debate erupted in the sixteenth century, even before James’ 
accession to the throne in London, much was made of the fact that throughout the 
medieval period Scottish kings paid homage to English monarchs, with the rather pointed 
implication that the Scots “owed allegiance to the English crown” – a part of the history 
of the island that seemed only to confirm the veracity of the Brute myth.1  Long before 
James and the Union of the Crowns, Henry VIII had issued a Declaration on whose title 
page is written that there “appereth the trewe and right title that the kings most royall 
maiesty hath to the soverayntie of Scotlande.”2  Not only did Henry cite the Brute myth 
to bolster his claim that Scotland was a tributary kingdom, he also listed twenty-two 
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instances of Scottish kings pledging fealty to the reigning English monarch.3  Henry’s 
thinking on Scotland’s rightful place in the hierarchy left no room for doubt.  He wrote 
that no king “hath more iuste title, more evident title, more certayn title, to any realm ...  
than we have to Scotland.”4  Monmouth’s History struck a chord with the English and 
became enormously influential.  As we have seen, by the early modern period, the 
ancient myths enshrined in his narrative had become part of the national history of the 
English people, shaping their national identity with the sense of an ancient British 
heritage.  Assured of an ethnic line that stretched back into the ancient past of the island, 
the English increasingly equated that heritage with an implicit form of rightful dominion 
over the whole of Britain, an appellation that became synonymous with England.  Yet 
there was also a concurrent tradition of calling the entire island, “England,”5 implying a 
people with a complicated relationship with their perception of Britishness. 
 Clues in Shakespeare’s drama indicate profound unease with a Scottish monarch 
determined to impose his vision of Britishness on the English, for some a mortal threat 
not only to English notions of cultural superiority in Britain but to the English nation 
itself.  Macbeth registers the perception of a people who saw a disconnect between their 
national leader and the nation, possibly a reflection of the relationship between James and 
the English.  Under Elizabeth I, English national identity was intimately connected to the 
monarch, forming a relationship with Parliament that Claire McEachern calls “syncretic 
rather than antagonistic.”6  The Elizabethan sense of reverence for England and its 
separateness from other countries as well as the implicit connection between the nation 
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and its monarchs appear especially pronounced in John of Gaunt’s speech in 
Shakespeare’s Richard II: 
This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle, 
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, 
This other Eden, demi-paradise, 
This fortress built by Nature for herself 
Against infection and the hand of war, 
This happy breed of men, this little world, 
This precious stone set in the silver sea, 
Which serves it in the office of a wall, 
Or as a moat defensive to a house,  
Against the envy of less happier lands 
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm of England, 
This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings … 
This land of such dear souls, this dear dear land, 
Dear for her reputation throughout the world …7 
 
In this excerpt, the fiction of English exclusivity becomes apparent,8 illustrating the 
historical tradition of equating England and Britain without including the Welsh and 
Scots in the English polity.9  Yet for all England’s greatness, its contradictions are 
nevertheless evident.  It has, for example, both male and female qualities, and the country 
is both strong but also vulnerable in arguably the same way that Elizabeth fashioned 
herself to be, suggesting a natural affinity between the country and its monarch.  Also, 
Gaunt construes England’s physical reach as encompassing the whole of Britain.  His 
speech reveals a national disposition of placing the country at the cultural and political 
centre of Britain, but king and country are one and the same.  Nothing suggests a 
monarch pushing to change a country’s perception of itself.  McEachern argues that 
Gaunt’s soliloquy promotes the myth of a “chaste monarchy,” for the country’s monarchs 
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were literally born of the land, a land that nurtured them.  It thus follows that the 
Elizabethan sense of nationhood was tightly connected to the monarch and inherently 
defensive – unlike in Scotland where patriots were historically prepared to fight against 
monarchs deemed a threat to the country.  Significantly, the defensive position that the 
country takes suggests that the threats to England proved external and thus foreign.10  
Gaunt’s focus remains on the symbolism of the monarch’s central role in a country not so 
much confident and proud but surrounded by hostile neighbours.11  In Elizabethan 
England, the enemy was often Spain, the pope,12 Mary Queen of Scots, et cetera – 
external threats.  Gaunt paints a picture of a precious land whose inherent value stems 
from its separateness, whereby the familiar kept the foreign at bay.  This vision suggests 
that the only foreseeable way to maintain England’s unique idyllic quality was to separate 
it from the “less happier lands” that surrounded it with the perhaps inevitable 
consequence of engendering a national sense of superiority.       
 Unlike James when he took the English throne after her, Elizabeth proffered a 
“gendered humanization” of royal power.  For the queen, it meant a sentimentalized 
connection between ruler and ruled.  While this approach “animated the topos of female 
modesty,” its rhetoric allowed Elizabeth to emphasize “gendered modesty” as the basis 
for her relationship with Parliament that preserved the masculine sensibilities of male 
MPs.13  In her first address to Parliament as queen in 1559, Elizabeth used gender to 
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demark her role as dutiful servant, thereby effecting female modesty:  “I am already 
bound unto an husband, which is the Kingdom of England.”14  Even the diction she 
employed (i.e., “bound”) implied a sovereign who knew her place within the gender 
expectations of her day.  She might have been queen, but she remained deferential, 
positioning herself as second to her people – and to male MPs.  Though monarch, 
Elizabeth used rhetoric astutely to avoid upsetting sixteenth-century patriarchal beliefs.  
Her Golden Speech to the Commons towards the end of her reign in 1601 exemplifies her 
practice of using gender and humility to her advantage in such a way that underscored her 
respect for parliamentarians:   
To be a King and wear a crown is a thing more glorious to them that see it, than it 
is pleasant to them that bear it.  For myself, I was never so enticed with the 
glorious name of a King or royal authority of a Queen, as delighted that God hath 
made me His instrument to maintain His truth and glory, and to defend this 
Kingdom (as I said) from peril, dishonour, and tyranny and oppression.15 
 
The above excerpt illustrates her apt negotiation of gender, recreating both male and 
female roles into a practically genderless entity.16  Carole Levin argued that instead of 
falling victim to the intransigent resistance to her authority, Elizabeth defeated it by 
taking strength from apparent weaknesses as an unmarried woman.17  The following 
rhetorical question from her Golden Speech exemplifies just that sort of adept 
manipulation of sexism to her advantage.  Notable for Elizabeth’s self-effacing use of her 
gender, this passage emphasizes her personal limitations:  “Shall I ascribe anything to 
myself and my sexly [sic] weakness?  I were not worthy to live then.”  Her response 
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gives credit to God for her courage, thus adroitly emphasizing both her bravery and 
womanly need of help.18  Near the end of her Golden Speech, Elizabeth used language 
that suggests a loving matriarch, thus reinforcing a highly sentimentalized connection to 
her subjects:  “And though you have had and may have many princes more mighty and 
wise sitting in this seat, yet you never had or shall have any that will be more careful and 
loving.”19  Elizabeth’s rhetoric combines humility and affection and is “overwhelmingly 
female in gender expectation,” implying that one of her greatest personality traits was her 
ability to care for her people.20  There is nothing to suggest that the queen seeks to 
dominate Parliament or change the country.  Indeed, she identifies wholly with it in her 
pledge to defend England with all her might.      
 While the history of the intricate working relationship between Elizabeth and her 
Parliaments goes beyond the purview of this investigation, the queen’s recurring 
expressions of concern for the English people, such as in her Golden Speech, coupled 
with gendered modesty created a conciliatory tone that would provide a stark contrast 
with that of her successor.  Though the queen once set her sights on recapturing Calais, 
she used military forces abroad for defensive purposes (i.e., Scotland, France, and Spain) 
or to maintain the status quo, notably in Ireland.21  She never attempted, as James would, 
to recreate the country she inherited.  Elizabeth was famously reluctant to commit troops 
to international disputes, sending military forces abroad only when she felt compelled to 
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do so. 22  Other than the sort of national defensive stance that Gaunt envisions with his 
soliloquy, the queen never sought to expand her nation’s boundaries or redefine the 
country she ruled.  She made this point to Parliament in 1593:   
It may be thought simplicity in me that all this time of my reign [I] have not 
sought to advance my territories and enlarged my dominions, for opportunity hath 
served me to do it … I acknowledge my womanhood and weakness in that respect 
… My mind was never to invade my neighbours not to usurp upon any, only 
contented to reign over my own and to rule as a just prince.23  
 
In her speech, she made a virtue of not altering the country’s borders.  The queen played 
the part of verbal analogue to the Ditchley portrait that visually recreates Elizabeth’s lack 
of international ambition, depicting a rather grand queen whose expansive farthingale 
remains within the borders of England.24  Of course, using portraiture formed part of a 
concerted effort to fashion an image for the queen, and in this instance, the propaganda 
projected Elizabeth’s feminine mastery of her kingdom, all within its borders.25  
Although the queen’s famous speech at Tilbury illustrates her use of the “double image” 
man-woman she often presented of herself,26 she made clear her determination to protect 
England against foreign invasion:   
I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and 
stomach of a king, and of a king of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma 
or Spain, or any prince of Europe should dare invade the borders of my realm; to 
which, rather than any Dishonour shall grow by me, I myself will take up Arms, I 
myself will be your General.27    
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Her message suggests a monarch determined to keep to her own borders while defending 
them.  There is no hint of a desire to alter the country only to preserve it, and this address 
along with the Ditchley portrait suggests the sort of ruler Gaunt’s speech celebrates:  a 
monarch who is cut from the national cloth and whose every fibre is English, determined 
to defend against “less happier lands.”  Elizabeth made use of this sense of Englishness in 
a 1566 speech before Parliament when its members pressured her to marry for the sake of 
the royal succession.  She asked, “Was I not born in the realm?  Were my parents born in 
any foreign country?  Is there any cause I should alienate myself from being careful over 
this country?  Is not my kingdom here?”28  While the male parliamentarians lacked 
confidence in her gender, her rhetoric implies that her English birthright trumped 
concerns with her sex and legitimized her right to govern.  Elizabeth was an adroit ruler, 
portraying herself as a modest woman resolutely loyal to the England its Parliamentarians 
had always known. 
 Like Elizabeth, James employed a spousal metaphor to contextualize the vision he 
had of himself within the country’s governing power structure.  However, unlike his 
predecessor who portrayed herself as “bound” to England, James inverted the gender 
relationship between monarch and country.  Concurrent with this shift in the power 
dynamic, the king also inadvertently undermined the national myth of exclusivity.  When 
James delivered his first speech to Parliament in 1603, he portrayed himself as the 
incarnation of Britain:  “I am the husband and all the whole isle is my lawful wife; I am 
the head, and it is my body; I am the shepherd, and it is my flock.”29  Not only does his 
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talk of “the whole isle” erase national distinctions, James played the part of patriarch, 
assuming his place at the locus of power, the dominant male lording over his female 
subjects.  While Elizabeth used her body as a measure of physical boundaries to the 
English nation, James sought to use himself to integrate national differences.30  In his 
March 31, 1607 speech to Parliament, he emphasized his desire to ameliorate the 
differences between Scotland and England.  He wanted to make “those confining places 
which were the borders of the two kingdoms, the navell or umbilike.”31 In other words, 
he wanted to incorporate cultural difference into a country complacent with its national 
insularity.  In effect, the king sought to undermine the exclusivity of Englishness.  For his 
listeners, this proposal meant an unsettling reconfiguration of their national identity.  
Their king wanted “this most divinely-favoured of kingdoms” to accept another as equal.  
The thought of the radical alteration to the ancient constitution that would surely 
accompany such a union only amplified the anxiety of MPs.32  Furthermore, while 
Elizabeth’s personification of her reign created the impression of a sovereign in wilful 
fellowship with her people, James suggested a clear hierarchical relationship with himself 
squarely at the top of it.  The queen presented herself as the “submissive wife to the 
masculine authority of her kingdom.  Elizabeth feminized the monarch; James, the 
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monarch’s subjects.”33  Within the patriarchal expectations of the day, it was clear where 
MPs stood with their king.   
 However, the crown’s resumption of a male persona was not the source of 
concern among English parliamentarians.  In fact, with his accession to the throne, there 
was a notion that the monarchy had returned to its conventional (i.e., masculine) form.  
Francis Bacon spoke to this reversion when he wrote of the seemingly odd state of affairs 
that had confronted the country since the end of Henry VIII’s reign upon his death in 
1547: “I find the strangest variety that in like number of successions of any hereditary 
monarchy hath ever been known.  The reign of a child; the offer of usurpation; the reign 
of a lady married to a foreign Prince; and the reign of a lady solitary and unmarried.”34  
What concerned Westminster MPs was not James’ masculine authority but his attempt to 
recover the political power that Parliament gained under his Tudor predecessors, 
especially Henry VIII and Elizabeth I.  Though often considered a formidable ruler, in his 
unsuccessful attempt to convince Pope Clement VII to annul his marriage with Catherine 
of Aragon, Henry VIII turned to the so-called Reformation Parliament for statutory 
approval.  The resulting Act in Restraint of Appeals (1533) was arguably the most 
significant legislation to come of this Parliament, for it gave the king power detached 
from Rome but limited it with making the king-in-Parliament the actual locus of 
sovereign power.  While this legislative manoeuvre apparently increased the power of the 
crown, it also made Parliament responsible for determining the extent of that power.  In 
using Parliament to solve his dynastic objectives, Henry extended to the legislative 
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branch authority over the monarchy, thus diminishing the sovereignty of that institution.  
Subsequent legislation affirming Princess Elizabeth’s legitimacy and making Henry 
Supreme Head of the Church of England and attempting to direct the succession further 
confirmed Parliament’s increasing authority in setting the parameters of the sovereign’s 
powers.35      
 Yet even in recent, living memory of the MPs sitting in James’ first Parliament, 
the thought of running the country with no monarch, if only as a short stopgap measure, 
was not out of the question.  With Elizabeth’s refusal to marry and designate an heir, the 
fear of the political chaos that could ensue upon her decease drove William Cecil to 
create a plan Patrick Collinson called the “monarchical republic.”  Collinson argued that 
by 1572 the monarchy had lost its quality of “indelible and sacred anointing” that made it 
ostensibly indispensable, more akin in some respects to that of a magistrate, with the 
implication that the position proved necessary but the place holder less than 
indispensable.36  In his article, he focused on Cecil’s 1584 efforts to create a council that 
would run the country upon the queen’s decease.37  Yet this plan was not new in 1584; 
Cecil put forth essentially the same scheme in 1563.38  When Elizabeth fell seriously ill 
with smallpox in 1562, the lack of an heir amplified the fear of her loss, and thus Cecil’s 
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plan for governance came into being.  In a clause for a bill debated in the Commons, 
Cecil proposed that the Privy Council would continue to meet and essentially govern as 
an executive board in the deceased queen’s stead.  According to this plan, “by 
proclamation to be made by authorite of parlement it shall be declared to whom of right 
the Imperial crowne of this realme of England ought to belong.”39  This interregnum 
would end when Parliament selected the new ruler, thus transforming the kingdom into 
an elected hereditary monarchy.  Like Collinson, Stephen Alford argued that the effect of 
Cecil’s plan was to strip the mystery from the monarchy, while turning it into a functional 
arm of the country’s governing mechanism.  Gone was the idea that the monarch 
represented the body politic and body natural.  Cecil’s plan made clear that when the 
body natural died, the body politic continued.  No longer did the death of the ruler mean 
that the government ceased to exist, suggesting that political power was not completely 
vested in the monarch.  In effect, Cecil’s plan would have made the country’s governing 
mechanism superior in significance to the queen.40  In the days of Henry VIII, ruling the 
country without a monarch would have been unimaginable.  To be sure, Cecil’s plan did 
not go so far as to make such a ruler dispensable.  Even in 1584, the monarch was defined 
as “the life, the head, and the authoritie of all thinges that be doone in the realme of 
England.”41  Despite that theory, governing the country during a short interregnum 
became conceivable.  Though there were countervailing voices, notably Sir Thomas 
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Craig, arguing that the hereditary monarchy was crucial to the country’s survival,42 others 
such as Thomas Wilson argued that “the King’s eldest son, though the Kingdoms be 
hereditary, shall not be crowned without the consent of the parliament after the death of 
this father.”43  Several decades of political discourse made the brief absence of a ruling 
monarch seem plausible.  The body politic could survive without its head.  Against this 
political evolution, James assumed the throne with an air of pre-eminence that failed to 
impress Westminster MPs.   
 Rather than the syncretic relationship that Elizabeth shared with Parliament, 
James seemed almost determined to fashion an antagonistic relationship with English 
MPs.  Even prior to his arrival in London in 1603, James made it clear that he would 
brook no opposition to his style of kingship.  Quite simply, England would need to 
acquiesce to his theories of divine-right monarchy.  Despite his personal political 
ideology regarding the rights of kings, Wormald contended that James proved “a man of 
remarkably flexible political mind, a negotiator of considerable skill.”  Wormald 
maintained that while the king began his English reign with a highly ambitious plan for 
an incorporating union, he reduced the scope of union once English opposition became 
apparent.44  Yet Wormald neglected to note that it took James several years to come to 
that point;45 by 1607, the relationship between himself and Parliament had fractured 
along the political fault line of the union debate.  Already in 1604, after his first English 
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Parliament refused his request to name him King of Great Britain, he unilaterally 
proclaimed himself such, prompting anxious MPs to write papers against the loss of the 
name of England.46  Scholarship has traditionally propounded the idea that the conflict 
lay with James’ inability to understand the negotiation necessary with a powerful 
Parliament, consequently prompting the Commons to produce their Apology.47  
Suggesting that MPs’ fixation on their historical rights made Parliament complicit in their 
worsening relations with their king, some historians have disputed the assumption that 
James was wholly responsible for these tensions.  Nonetheless, as the main point of 
contention was James’ proposed union, the king must take much of the responsibility for 
pushing for historic changes especially after proclaiming himself King of Great Britain.48  
As Parliamentarians proudly connected their sense of national identity to “legislative 
sovereignty,” MPs easily took offence when James appeared to disregard it.49   
 When the Scottish James VI arrived in England to ascend the country’s throne, he 
violated the precepts that had guided the relationship between Elizabeth and Parliament.  
Claire McEachern argued that as a Scot, he ran afoul of the “oppositional structure of 
nationhood” grounded in xenophobia underwritten by Calvinist exclusivity, an outlook 
that “celebrated the boundary between those who were chosen to inhabit [England], and 
those who were not.  It was a fiction of exclusivity whose appeal depended upon its 
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exclusions.”50  Though Colin Kidd agreed that a sense of exceptionalism permeated 
Englishness, he did not necessarily tie it directly to xenophobia.  Rather, Kidd contended 
that the resplendent jewel in the shining sea signified a land that rejected absolute 
monarchy,51 the sort of political position James VI celebrated in The True Law of Free 
Monarchies.52  Kidd’s premise notwithstanding, with James as reigning monarch, the 
myth of national exclusivity that permeates Gaunt’s speech becomes untenable unless 
one begins to exclude the king or the king becomes English.  With James, the myth of 
exclusivity became much more invaluable.  While he sought to strengthen the national 
sense of self, he inadvertently confused it when he sought to alter the relationship 
between England and Scotland, thereby tampering with the longstanding English 
presumption of primacy.53  Furthermore, as early as April 1604, his drive to create a 
united British state unleashed “acute constitutional alarm” among English MPs, thereby 
engendering an antagonistic relationship between the two institutions of English 
governance, crown and Parliament.54  While conflict between reigning monarch and 
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sitting MPs punctuated English history long before the Jacobean era, James’ desire for an 
incorporating union between Scotland and England so unnerved many members of the 
Commons that legal philosophers led by Sir Edward Coke developed a distortion of 
heretofore accepted legal theory in order to substantiate their opposition to political union 
with Scotland.   
 
The king and the ancient constitution as alternative repository of national sovereignty.   
 As the debate in the House of Commons over union became increasingly 
contentious, several members – most especially Sir Edwin Sandys, Sir Maurice Berkley, 
and Thomas Hedley – latched onto the idea that the king’s plan threatened the very 
foundation of the English nation with mortal destruction.  To defend their position against 
political union with Scotland, these nationalists publicized the idea that the common law 
would necessarily give way to civil law, were the two countries to merge.  For the anti-
union faction, the potential loss of the common law made the king’s plan impossible.  
They argued that these laws, known collectively as the ancient constitution, stretched 
back into time immemorial, acting as some sort of anchor to England’s mythic past.  
That, at any rate, is what they wanted to think.  Yet there is evidence to suggest that these 
same parliamentarians knew that the common law was far more flexible than they were 
willing to concede.  Given the evidence that the common law was long thought anything 
but inviolate, it seems particularly curious that these learned men would misrepresent the 
role of the country’s customary law – and by extension, the ancient constitution.  Among 
historians, there are two schools of thought regarding the perception of the common law’s 
significance to the English national sense of self.  Although Pocock argued that by 1604 
112 
 
belief in the sanctity of the common law was absolute among Westminster MPs,55 
Christopher Brooks and Kevin Sharpe refuted that assertion, citing contemporary legal 
discourse that ultimately rejected the superiority of the English common law.56  That the 
anti-union faction likely over-looked the relative mutability of the customary law, thus 
inflating the significance of the ancient constitution, sheds considerable light on the 
national insecurities that James’ proposed Anglo-Scottish union unleashed within the 
House of Commons.   
During the union debate, the fierceness with which MPs fought to preserve the 
country’s legal system signified a shift in legal and political thinking, largely wrought by 
James’ theories of divine right rule and political union.  While Elizabeth repeatedly 
sought throughout her reign to limit debate in the Commons,57 the queen respected the 
law, posing no threat to it.58  Along with her close identification with the country she 
ruled, Elizabeth’s respect for its common law seems to have precluded the sort of 
reactionary defence of it that arose during her successor’s reign.  Largely for that reason, 
explicit, political reverence for customary law during the Tudor queen’s reign rarely 
emerged.59  The balance between queen and law settled into an equipoise that gave 
weight to Richard Crompton’s theory that good Christians demonstrated absolute fealty 
to her rule with complete obedience.  In his pamphlet entitled, A short declaration of the 
end of Traytors, Crompton, an influential Elizabethan lawyer and proponent of divine 
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right monarchy, warned his fellow subjects against “destroying” or “apposing themselves 
against their prince.”60  According to contemporary thinking, the Christian deity chose 
Elizabeth to lead, and nothing she did prompted her subjects, including common lawyers, 
to question her prerogative so long as she respected certain expectations that came with 
her office, including maintaining respect for the country’s common law.61  Though the 
lack of an heir apparent discomfited parliamentarians, the survival of the nation seemed 
far from anyone’s mind.   
That complacency ended in the 1590s.  With a childless queen on the throne, the 
Commons focused on the question of the royal succession.  For all the uncertainty 
surrounding the monarchy, the common law provided an “alternative locus for the 
continuity of the English state,” separate from the reigning monarch, a sort of latent 
national bulwark against the uncertainty of royal prerogative and presumably the crown.  
In other words, the country’s historic legal system offered an alternative repository for 
national sovereignty, separate from the crown and safeguarded by parliamentarians 
should the need ever arise.62  In the event, the legal and political minds of the late 
Elizabethan era accepted an ancient constitutionalism.  However, as the queen never 
appeared to threaten the integrity of the country’s legal foundation, politicians and 
scholars never felt a need to actively, let alone vociferously, defend it or even articulate 
it.  They knew that customs and institutions were “peculiar” in other countries and that 
they developed in such a way to “peculiarly” fit the idiosyncratic needs of their country.  
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In England, a balance between “rule of law” and “rule of prince” developed.  In practical 
terms, the common law tempered the excesses of divine right monarchy.63  Under 
Elizabeth, the balance was maintained between crown and the common law, preventing 
the perception of a royal threat to English tradition.      
With the advent of Stuart rule in the southern kingdom, that equipoise between 
royal prerogative and common law no longer seemed certain, and English MPs appear to 
have taken advantage of the apparent imbalance to put a stop to unifying Scotland and 
England under one parliament.  While the basic idea of how to forge a country with two 
legal systems had been a genuinely perplexing concern at the start of James’ reign, by 
1607, the conundrum gave the anti-union faction at Westminster ammunition to fight 
against the king’s plan.  When James came south to assume the English throne, he 
brought with him his well-known notions of absolute monarchy.  This was, after all, the 
Scottish monarch who called himself “God’s lieutenant”64 and “deputie”65 and argued 
that “the office [was] given him by God over them,”66 his people including MPs whom 
he called his “vassals.”67  His divine right theory threatened the restraining mechanisms 
of the legal system that had worked well during his predecessor’s reign.  That his desired 
Anglo-Scottish union appeared only to amplify the threat emboldened his opponents.  For 
them, the proposed union meant that civic law would replace the common law, a scenario 
that proved unacceptable and gave opponents a platform from which to wage battle 
against the king’s political ambitions.  In effect, the “union of laws” provided the 
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“political means” to fight union with Scotland.68  That the House of Commons had 
assumed more authority during the Tudor era must have put James’ beliefs about absolute 
monarchy into even starker relief.69  To that point, Venetian ambassador Nicolo Molin 
reported the incongruity between the practice and demeanour of MPs and the king’s 
expectations:  
It cannot be denied that originally and for many years later the authority of 
members was great, for each one was permitted, without fear of punishment, to 
speak his mind freely on all that concerned the State, even to the touching of the 
King's person, who, to speak the truth, was rather the head of a Republic than a 
Sovereign. But now that the Sovereign is absolute, matters move in a very 
different fashion.70     
 
Unfortunately for James, his desire for an incorporating union between England and 
Scotland became mired in two ancillary yet significant concerns, the English perception 
of themselves and the rightful locus of sovereign power within the nascent English state.  
 James’ accession to the throne coupled with his political theories became a 
fulcrum that altered the political discourse about England’s common law.  A basic 
premise of customary law was that the past could inform and thus guide the present.71  In 
a society that looked for precedents to guide its system of law and governance, a new 
legal system presumably consequent to union would untether England’s connection to its 
past, thus interfering with the national myth that tied the country and its common law to 
time immemorial if not Brutus himself.  Ultimately, the debate reshaped the lens through 
which English parliamentarians viewed themselves as a people.  As a consequence, the 
political discourse became shrill.  Sir John Doddridge exemplifies some of the more 
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thoughtful, restrained rhetoric that emerged in the beginning of James’ reign in 1604:  
“But lawes were never in any kingedome totallie altered without great danger of the 
evercion of the whole state.”72  While Doddridge spoke of absolutes, his tone remained 
perceptibly measured.  However, by 1607, when the union debate was reaching a 
crescendo, the rhetoric had heated considerably.  Sir Maurice Berkley argued against 
union to his fellow MPs, grounding his rhetoric in a defence of the common law:  “Those 
Laws [are] written in the Blood of our Ancestors.  Never believe that these Laws should 
admit such Inconveniences, as the Participation under One personal Subjection.”73  
Berkley’s impassioned defence of the common law reveals the sort of rhetoric that 
entwined the English people and their ancient constitution so tightly that many in 
Parliament saw them as practically the same.  Calling to the fore the blood of their 
forbears creates a near-sacred mutually constitutive construct of nation and government.  
It therefore follows that violating that relationship risked destroying the very foundation 
on which England stood.  Yet for all Berkley’s dedication to his ancestors’ sacrifices and 
the country’s ancient constitution, such rhetoric would have been out of place even at the 
tail end of Elizabeth’s reign.  While the personal objectives that drove Berkley to deliver 
such a speech are difficult to discern, evidence suggests that MPs looked to that 
alternative locus of national sovereignty, the common law, to thwart the king’s efforts to 
create a political union between Scotland and England.  The idea of a static legal system 
reaching into time immemorial took shape after James ascended the English throne, 
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providing his opponents an ancient constitution with which to stop the union from taking 
place.74                 
 Under James, many in the Commons considered the king’s efforts a direct threat 
to the country’s legal system, and by1607, this fear had become entrenched in the 
political discourse surrounding the question of union.  In their speeches, Doddridge and 
Berkley reflect the sort of ancient constitutionalism that came alive at the beginning of 
James’ reign, and Sir Edward Coke was instrumental in redefining the common law as an 
immutable anchor to the country’s past.75  Because judges could create law through their 
individual rulings, many found the legal system uncertain even during Elizabeth’s reign.  
Despite those misgivings, the union of laws that would necessarily accompany the union 
of countries would change the legal system beyond recognition, a scenario wholly 
unpalatable to many MPs and which opened an avenue for resistance against the king’s 
efforts.76  Coke published his first two Reports in 1600 and 1602, essentially paying 
homage to the common law; however, when the fourth volume appeared in 1604, Coke 
argued that any fundamental change to the legal system would endanger the stability of 
the country.  He contended that “the King is under no man, but only God and the law; for 
the law makes the King:  Therefore let the king attribute that to the law, which from the 
law he hath received, to wit, power and dominion; for where will and not law doth sway, 
there is no king.”77  In other words, without the law, the system of governance would 
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upend.  In his fifth and sixth Reports, published in 1607 and 1608 respectively, Coke 
argued that the common law was immemorial, never tainted by Norman influence, and 
the birthright of every Englishman.  Coke’s Reports proved crucial to changing the 
narrative regarding the country’s legal system.78  One effect was a hardening of the 
conceptual image of the meaning of Englishness.     
 Although McEachern argues that parliamentarians used the common law as a 
defence against the king’s proposal, she misses the significance of their behaviour, 
something they themselves appear to have overlooked.  MPs not only found union an 
existential threat, they defined Englishness as a sense of national identity connected to the 
country’s myth of an ancient past that produced a civilizing set of laws with the 
implication that English culture was rightfully superior to those of its neighbours.79  
Without realizing it, in actively working to protect the law, they divested themselves of 
the power to change it, arguing that it was inviolable, thus, by extension, rendering their 
national identity uncompromising.  The educated elite with knowledge of the law knew 
Sir John Fortescue’s fifteenth-century assertion that the customs of a people defined 
them.  Such customs gave the nation its “second nature.”  To cast aside such conventions 
would mean an end to the “distinctive existence” of said people, what Pocock called “the 
medieval version of identity.”80  While some have argued that Fortescue’s ethos 
regarding the significance of national traditions became a guiding principle for early 
modern jurists, Brooks and Sharpe dispute that claim, citing late sixteenth-century 
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English commentators and lawyers who freely acknowledged continental influence on 
their country’s institutions and laws.  The intellectual discourse of the Tudor period 
allowed for a broader sense of Englishness, largely free of the claustrophobic 
identification with the common law that Fortescue would have found appropriate.81  
Nevertheless, it was his line of thinking that framed the rhetoric during the union debate 
and in its aftermath.  In his speech to the House of Commons regarding the common law, 
Thomas Hedley’s tone and sentiment approximates those of Berkley:   
The parliament may find some defects in the common law and amend them …, 
yet the wisest parliament that ever was could never have made such an excellent 
law as the common law is.  But that the parliament may abrogate the whole law, I 
deny, for that were includedly [sic] to take away the power of the parliament 
itself, which power it hath by the common law.82   
 
Hedley paints a picture of a body of law that grew organically from amorphous origins, a 
guiding paradigm that supplied the theoretical framework for the governing institutions 
of the country that ostensibly postdated it.  Furthermore, Hedley called the common law 
“the life and soul of the politic body of the commonwealth, as the king is the head 
thereof; and as they attempt to alter or change the head of this body, though there be 
pretense or intent to establish a better in the room, is high treason ...”83  To abrogate the 
common law could only mean dissolving themselves as a nation.  Unfortunately for 
James, in the minds of many MPs, his dream of an Anglo-Scottish union threatened just 
that sort of dissolution of the English people.84  The anxiety that his objective prompted 
had the added effect of strengthening the English belief that their ancient constitution had 
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emerged through an organic process of generation from time immemorial.85  To lose that 
ancient constitution was unthinkable.  In the early modern English mind, the Welsh had 
adopted these facets of Englishness as their own.  In a similar vein, the Scots could 
follow the same path to become English eventually, but the English could never become 
Scots.86     
For English MPs, their mistrust of their king was not simply a case of 
Scotophobia; rather, James’ Scottishness, or quite simply, his coming of age in a different 
country with dissimilar political and legal traditions, kept him from understanding the 
profound symbolic significance of his inherited country’s legal foundation, and thus the 
ancient constitution, to the English nation.87  The irony of a king leading a country whose 
law and general political culture he did not understand could not have been greater.  Yet 
James had never had the need to think himself subordinate to laws and parliaments.  He 
was a monarch raised within a different political culture, and his insensitivity to English 
sensitivities showed.88   
Nevertheless, historians might forgive the king’s apparent lack of understanding 
for the impassioned fealty of MPs to the ancient constitution – arguably national 
mythology, political tradition, and law in equal measure.  It was, after all, a rather 
                                                          
85 Brooks and Sharpe, “History, English Law and the Renaissance,” 138; Pocock, The Discovery of Islands, 
53. 
86 Pocock, Ibid., 53. 
87 Russell, “James VI and I and Rule Over Two Kingdoms,” 158-59. 
88 Even when James needed Parliament in his drive to forge his desired union, he dismissed signs of their 
discontent. In response to a formal grievance that MPs presented James in May 1606 regarding excessive 
spending and long absences from London, among other items, he “admonished” them, instructing MPs that 
“where the Grievance is small, and the Alteration great and weighty to the Crowne, [they] should not urge 
it; as himself on the other Side would not prefer his owne small Profitt before a Common Grievance of 
great Moment.”  Bowyer, The Parliamentary Diary, 166; the Venetian ambassador, Zorzi Giustinian, noted 
the widespread discontent with the king among MPs as a result.  CSPV, 1603-1607, 341-354.  See also 
Francis Bacon’s report: CJ (May 15, 1606): I, 309.  
121 
 
intangible jumble of ad hoc judicial decisions, rulings, and cultural practice that 
ostensibly gave the English people and their country meaning and shape.  In the 
following excerpt, Pocock’s definition underscores the ancient constitution’s amorphous 
existence:   
The relations of government and governed in England were assumed to be 
regulated by law; the law in force in England was assumed to be the common law; 
all common law was assumed to be custom, elaborated, summarized and enforced 
by statute; and all custom was assumed to be immemorial, in the sense that any 
declaration of even change of custom – uttered by a judge from his bench, 
recorded by a court in a precedent, or registered by king-in-parliament as a statute 
– presupposed a custom already ancient and not necessarily recorded at the time 
of writing.89        
 
The common law, the body of which formed the so-called ancient constitution, rested 
upon experience and decisions of earlier generations, bringing their collective wisdom 
together to undergird England’s governance.  While codified civil laws reflected the 
rationale of one man or one generation, custom transcended the vagaries of the country’s 
demands reaching back into time immemorial.  In 1612, the Attorney General for Ireland, 
Sir John Davies, defined the common law as crucial to England’s existence, proffering a 
picture of a near flawless national framework refined by generations to fit the national 
character precisely.  According to him, the common law  
can be recorded and registered no-where but in the memory of the people.  For a 
Custome taketh beginning and growth to perfection in this manner:  When a 
reasonable act once done is found to be good and beneficiall to the people, and 
agreeable to their nature and disposition, then do they use it and practise it again 
and again, and so by often iteration and multiplication of the act it becometh a 
Custome;  and being continued without interruption time out of mind, it obtaineth 
the force of a Law.  And this Customary Law is the most perfect and most 
excellent, and without comparison the best, to make and preserve a 
Commonwealth.90    
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Parliament cannot manufacture such perfection, for “written laws” are thus forced on a 
population without the benefit of “trial or probation” which ensures that a law does not 
“bind” or “inconvenience.”  Should an inconvenience arise, the law would no longer 
exist, and thus, through the practice of custom, the common law became “fit and 
agreeable to the nature and disposition of the people.”91  Indeed, customary law was 
“connatural to the Nation.”92  Its survival proved its viability and wisdom greater than 
any individual, even greater than Parliament.  Furthermore, customary law evolved 
organically from the earliest glimmerings of the English people and was thus free from 
the taint of foreign influence.  The common law, moreover, was “purely native,” 
inherently English unlike James.  It reflected the “wisdom and experience” of the English 
nation and would not denigrate “the people’s glory and self-sufficiency.”93  Certainly, the 
very existence of customary law suggested a system of legal governance that proved 
perfectly suited to the nation that created it.   
 Sir John Davies’ claim that the common law proved “purely native” is telling for 
its rather blatant inaccuracy, and it seems highly unlikely that he would not have known 
of his historical amnesia.  Indeed, Davies was a member of the Society of Antiquaries.  
Founded in 1588, the Society corresponded with like-minded scholars in continental 
Europe, especially in France.  Following the example of their European counterparts, 
members of the Society engaged in an etymological analysis of the history of English 
institutions.  Though nationalistic, they openly accepted that many of their most 
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cherished customs were not ancient, and many of those traditions, in fact, had originated 
with the Normans.94  As a lawyer member of the Society, Davies accepted the reality of 
Norman influence on English traditions and institutions.95  Yet the significance in his 
statement lies not so much in its fallaciousness but rather in the progression of the union 
debate that prompted him, like many of his fellow MPs, to defend the common law as if 
it were the last redoubt of Englishness.  Pocock argued that Elizabethan lawyers believed 
the common law to be static and immemorial, but under James, “the increasing activity of 
a nearly sovereign monarchy” transformed myths into incontrovertible fact.  Under 
Elizabeth, the notion of the common law as ancient and immutable was “a convenient 
fiction.”  With the advent of Jacobean rule, the myth “was heatedly asserted as literal 
historical truth.”96  Pocock’s assertion notwithstanding, Brooks and Sharpe rejected the 
argument that common lawyers of the Jacobean period uniformly believed in the sanctity 
of the ancient constitution.  Like Davies, many MPs adhered staunchly to the myth that 
the common law had been a legal mechanism insulated from outside influences.  This 
rhetorical stance, however, first emerged after the start of Jacobean rule.  Their altered 
perspective appears to have been a response to the king’s push to create an equal union 
with Scotland and Coke’s series of published tracts. 
Evidence suggests that until the regnal union, early modern scholars and jurists 
were far more intellectually curious than Pocock acknowledged.  In other words, belief in 
the sanctity of the common law was not absolute.  Brooks and Sharpe demonstrated quite 
clearly that late in Elizabeth’s reign many English lawyers and intellectuals accepted the 
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influence of not only the civil law upon the common law but also feudalism and the 
Norman Conquest, factors that Pocock overlooked.  In the 1590s, Francis Bacon wrote of 
“the uncertainty of law, which is the principal and most just challenge that is made to the 
laws of our nation at this time,” suggesting that the country’s common law needed 
“correction.”97  Bacon eventually recommended a compilation of the laws in order to 
catalogue and amend them for the good of the country, focusing especially on the 
uncertainty of the legal code.  Support for Bacon’s proposal proved widespread within 
the legal profession, with many critics agreeing that there were simply too many laws, 
many of which were unenforced, obsolete, or overly complex.98  Even Thomas Hedley, 
among other lawyers, lent his support to Bacon’s efforts.  Indeed, Brooks and Sharpe 
argued that “there is nothing to suggest that lawyers were reluctant to face change” in the 
common law.99  In a 1592 speech delivered to the House of Commons, Coke used the 
term “Elephantine Leges” to suggest an unnecessarily cumbersome legal system,100 
sentiments the queen shared in 1597.101  Part of the openness to criticism of the 
customary law stemmed from the growing trend of young, aspiring lawyers to attend 
Cambridge and Oxford prior to their training at the inns of court.  The university 
curricula exposed them to civil law and thus alternative legal codes.  Furthermore, there 
is a seventeenth-century history that reveals knowledge of medieval influence of the civil 
law on English common law, and of course, the Society of Antiquaries acknowledged 
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Norman influence after the Conquest.102  Yet this relative openness to intellectual 
discourse regarding the country’s legal foundation appears to have ended with the advent 
of the regnal union.  Elizabeth’s death and James’ subsequent accession to the English 
throne in 1603 arguably wrought a nationalist response that prompted a reactionary 
defence of the common law.103 
 The political uncertainty of the early Jacobean period produced the sort of 
common law consensus that Pocock described.  The opponents of James’ union 
refashioned the perception of English customary law to represent an immutable link to 
the country’s past, a sort of anchor securing England against losing itself in a strong 
Scottish current.  Certainly, there were still independent voices such as Bacon who 
championed civil law or the reformation of the common law.  However, the prevailing 
political winds took their lead from Sir Edward Coke who argued in the first years of 
James’ English reign that the common law was wiser than any individual, and that “no 
man,” not even the king, “ought to take it on himself to be wiser than the laws.”104  Part 
of such fervour reflects a reaction against civil lawyers who largely supported the king’s 
prerogative, at a time when the Scottish monarch’s plans for union seem to have 
challenged the primacy of English dominance in Britain.105 It was Coke’s contention that 
the ‘common laws are the most equal and most certain, of greatest antiquity and least 
delay and most beneficial and easy to be observed’ of any alternative legal code.106  
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Brooks and Sharpe contended that in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth 
centuries English lawyers were far less secure in their country’s laws and far more 
knowledgeable of the influence of continental European and civil law on the ancient 
constitution than Pocock and Donald R. Kelley acknowledged.107  Brooks and Sharpe 
maintained that Coke did not represent the prevailing consensus but rather a significant 
shift in beliefs regarding English history and law among early modern scholars and 
jurists.  That that change in regard for the common law occurs early in the Jacobean 
period reinforces the notion of the magnitude of the perceived threats of divine right 
monarchy and of an incorporating union with Scotland.   
 
Friction between James and English tradition and introverted Englishness.   
 For many, the common law appeared to sustain the existence of the nation.  While 
the union debate intensified the significance of the ancient constitution to many English 
MPs, the dimensions of a possible political union with Scotland began to affect the 
cultural constellation of the country.   A change in English perceptions of themselves as a 
people began to take shape a few years into James’ English reign.  Although 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth provides a hint of the reconfiguration of English national 
consciousness and the anxiety such a shift caused in the early modern body politic, 
literary and non-literary sources document the evolving perception of the English sense 
of national self.  Though the notion of Britishness existed, its defining value for the 
English people was at best limited, or indirectly, contested.  The national shift away from 
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an English identity that looked beyond its own borders towards a much more insular, 
national identity appears to have begun in the transitional months spanning 1606 – 1607.  
Not long after James assumed the throne in England, nostalgia for the Tudors took 
hold.  Though Henry VII, Henry VIII, and Elizabeth found it politically efficacious to 
emphasize their Welsh heritage on occasion,108 the public image of Elizabeth remained 
comfortably English.109  Shakespeare’s drama reflects that shifting perspective and traces 
the trajectory of national consciousness, revealing the evolving relationship that the 
English shared with the British cultural and political landscape around them.  His 
Elizabethan histories went a long way to define the cultural constellation of Englishness, 
a role that continued during the first decade of the Jacobean kingship in England.  Upon 
the accession of James to the English throne, the playwright’s explorations of identity 
went from an emphasis on Englishness to that of Britishness.  Significantly, however, 
several years into the Scottish king’s reign, the dramatist’s diction eventually reverted to 
denotations of Englishness, suggesting a desire for a more insular notion of 
nationhood.110  With Henry VIII, Shakespeare reveals the nostalgia for the Tudor dynasty 
but also affirms the localized nationality devoid of any reference to Scotland and thus a 
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parochial national consciousness that arguably leaves little room for a greater British 
identity.  English national sentiment resisted a broadening to a general Britishness when 
that identity threatened the primacy of English identity.   
Henry VIII reveals nostalgia for the Tudor past that suggests a renewed desire to 
maintain English national identity in the face of the apparent Jacobean drive to supplant it 
with a British identity.  The playwright’s history reveals the desire for a stable English 
national identity, arguably a reaction against James’ reign and his apparent challenge to 
the English national ethos.  While the historic Henry’s quest for a son has long figured as 
one of the great, perhaps infamous, episodes of English history, he could little know that 
Elizabeth would leave such a powerful impression on the country he once ruled.  As the 
daughter of the ill-fated Anne Boleyn, Elizabeth became the Tudor dynasty’s direct link 
to the Stuart line in general and James VI and I in particular.  Though purportedly about 
Henry VIII, Shakespeare’s drama acts like a mirror, reflecting the cultural and political 
effect of the proposed union between England and Scotland.  His work celebrates the 
contemporary achievement of James and his Queen Consort, Anne, while reflecting the 
nostalgia for Elizabeth’s reign.  Concurrently, this 1612 hagiographic depiction of the 
Tudor queen hints at a sense of national sentiment that gained in vigour with the Scottish 
king’s attempt to alter English identity, an identity seemingly made stronger by the 
playwright’s exclusive use of the country’s name as opposed to any variant of Briton, 
Britain, or British.111  By the time of Henry VIII, the union debate was dead.112  
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Nevertheless, English national identity had taken strength from it, albeit from a 
contraction of its conceptual scope. 
 In the play, the newborn Elizabeth provides a bridge to James and eventually 
reveals the nostalgia for the future queen’s reign rife in England at the time of this play’s 
performance in 1612.113  Before long, it quickly becomes apparent that the significance 
of this child goes far beyond her recent birth.  In his soliloquy delivered in celebration of 
the new princess, Cranmer engages in a fit of premature hagiography for a child still in 
her infancy.  He claims that “truth shall nurse her / Holy and heavenly thoughts still 
counsel her. / She shall be lov’d and fear’d.”114  He continues, portraying the 
consequences of her life as that of rich blessings for Elizabeth’s kingdom:  “In her days 
every man shall eat in safety / Under his own vine what he plants, and sing / The merry 
songs of peace to all his neighbours. / God shall be truly known.”115  The language paints 
a romantic picture of a future time when under Elizabeth’s tenure, life will reach new 
heights of bountiful glory.  For Shakespeare’s audience, the eyewitnesses to this fictional 
rendition of the recent past, the topicality must have been obvious.  After three years of 
the Jacobean monarch, a growing sense of nostalgia for his predecessor had taken hold on 
the imaginations of the people of London.  Of late, they had seen Elizabeth’s remains 
disinterred and placed with those of her sister to make room for the foreign woman she 
had had executed, Mary Queen of Scots.  At the same time, their Scottish king had 
redesigned the country’s flag and had seemingly questioned the very identity of England 
itself.  James’ accession to the throne had prompted him to push the parliamentarians at 
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Westminster to approve a political union between Scotland and England, and the 
resulting questions surrounding English national identity had fuelled the reappraisal of 
Queen Elizabeth’s reign as one of English national certainty.116  Yet the play hints at a 
complex response to James.  Though respect for the king remains apparent, the 
hagiographic reverence for the late queen, and by extension the eponymous King Henry, 
suggests a broader concern with national identity.  In the following passage, Cranmer 
appears briefly to demonstrate his respect for James when the Archbishop speaks of 
Elizabeth whose death will beget an heir as great as she: 
Nor shall this peace sleep with her; but as when  
the bird of wonder dies, the maiden phoenix, 
Her new ashes new create another heir 
As great in admiration as herself …117 
 
 Daniel Woolf argued that this passage reflects the parallel sense of reverence for both 
monarchs, the current and his predecessor.  In other words, nostalgia for Elizabeth did not 
necessarily mean dislike of James.  Yet Woolf also noted that nostalgia for the Tudor 
queen was already evident in 1606, the year that the union debate became especially 
acrimonious.118  It was unlikely coincidental that in the aftermath of a debate that called 
into question the very place of England and Englishness within a greater Britain, 
Shakespeare penned a history celebrating two strong Tudor monarchs who were not only, 
in comparison to James, English but also believed in their country’s leading role in 
Britain.  Cranmer continues his prophecy, celebrating that though Elizabeth will die a 
virgin, she will take her place among the saints after ruling as “the happiness of 
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England.”119  Cranmer’s nod to the Stuart king connects the play to the contemporary 
world in which the audience lived, but the romanticized vision of the recently deceased 
Elizabeth provides a sense of the popular sentiment of Jacobean England and reinforces 
the topicality of the play.  Shakespeare’s Henry VIII is as much a historical artefact of the 
world the playwright inhabited as it is a history of the Tudor king.120         
 The discomfort among some MPs with the proposed union with Scotland 
crystalized into staunch opposition when union meant a reconfiguration of English 
national identity.  Though they might not have voiced it explicitly, that identity had been 
closely aligned with an Anglocentric perspective of the British Isles, one with England 
securely atop the regional national hierarchy.  When James’ proposal appeared to 
challenge this vision of themselves as the politically dominant people of the region, many 
MPs dug in against the perceived threat of institutionally sanctioned national inferiority.  
In fact, proposals that required no change to the perception of English superiority found a 
relatively easy time of it in Parliament, something James eventually learned.  By 1607, he 
had limited the scope of his objectives and sought the nullification of the hostile laws and 
the unique legal status of the Borders; both proposals met success.  English MPs initiated 
the third proposal of a commercial union, an idea that found support in the Commons 
including the idea for a shared currency.  The fourth proposal called for the naturalization 
of Scots born after the regnal union, the so-called post-nati; this idea failed when it 
                                                          
119 Shakespeare, Henry VIII, V.iv.57-60. 
120 Woolf contended that “the natural and inevitable celebration of the memory of a popular dead monarch” 
is not necessarily indicative of disdain for her successor.  He maintained that the number of literary signs of 
reverence for James after his decease equaled those for Elizabeth during the early years of Jacobean rule.  
Yet during James’ lifetime, writers including Shakespeare were usually careful to avoid criticism of the 
reigning monarch and would have known of the near-catastrophic fate that George Chapman, Ben Jonson, 
and John Marston faced in 1605 with their unflattering depiction of Scots in Eastward Ho!  Shakespeare 
was under no obligation to flatter the long-deceased Henry VIII and his daughter, Elizabeth I.  See Woolf, 
“Two Elizabeths? James I and the Late Queen’s Famous Memory,” 190. 
132 
 
became embroiled in a protracted argument concerning the law. That debate bogged 
down in controversy surrounding the nature of allegiance.  If citizenship meant allegiance 
to the king, there could be nothing wrong with affording the post-nati the same 
citizenship rights that were the birthright of every Englishman and woman; however, if 
citizenship denoted allegiance to the law, there could be no common citizenship as there 
were two legal systems.121  Taking the leadership position against a full incorporating 
union, Sir Edwin Sandys proved a vociferous antagonist throughout the parliamentary 
debate from its beginning.  His unyielding opposition remained staunchly static and 
thereby reflects the general mythic vision of England’s place as the regional hegemon.  
As the dimensions of James’ plan for union became more widely known, many people 
turned against it.  In 1604, Sandys told Parliament:  “So that we cannot be other than we 
are, being English we cannot be Britaynes.”122  While his statement came at the 
beginning of the union debate in the early years of James’ reign, a few years later in 
1607, Sandys revealed that his position had not changed.  He insisted in the House of 
Commons that “the Scottish [must yield] to our Lawse which maketh the perfect” 
sovereignty.123  Revealing a similar anxious attachment to his nation, one of Sandys’ 
fellow MPs shared his fear that the king would change the country’s name:  “[O]ur 
ancestors put us in possession of this kingdom and by that name we took it.”  Any change 
to the country’s appellation was not simply “to make a conquest of our name” but to 
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extinguish what we are.”124  For these two men and many of their like-minded 





                                                          






 By 1612, the prospects for an Anglo-Scottish union during James’ lifetime had 
ended, and there was little evidence that England’s people had adopted a British national 
identity, one that would bring Britons from across their island together into a unity of 
purpose.1  In London, the English considered resident Scots an awkward relevance, and 
that was at best.  In the streets, men from opposing kingdoms engaged in violent scuffles.  
At court, ongoing resentment of the Scottish presence manifested itself in tense 
squabbling.2  The following libel represents an English perspective of the depraved 
behaviour its author attached to James’ countrymen.  Among other things, it alludes to an 
infamous incident of the time involving the Scottish Robert Crichton, earl of Sanquhar.  
He lost an eye while engaged in swordplay with English fencing master, John Turner.  A 
few years thereafter in May 1612, the Scottish earl hired assassins to murder the 
Englishman.  For his efforts, Sanquhar was executed.  Nine years into James’ English 
reign, this notorious murder confirmed in the English imagination the sort of trouble that 
even the better bred of the northern kingdom posed:           
They beg our goods, our lands, and our lives, 
They whip our Nobles and lie with their wives, 
They pinch our Gentrie, and send for the benchers, 
They stab our sergeants, and pistoll our fencers.   
Leave of proud Scotts thus to undo us, 
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Least we make you as poore as when you came to us.3 
 
Despite nearly a decade of Stuart rule, the English Scotophobic attitude had remained 
unchanged.  The Union of Crowns failed to bring the two peoples together as one nation.  
James’ hoped for unus grex – and its expected intermarriage, increased cultural contact, 
and assimilation – never came to fruition.4     
The ruling elites rejected James not so much for his Scottishness but for his desire 
for change.  The king’s drive to create a political union between Scotland and England, 
even under the auspices of Westminster, found no purchase among the MPs who would 
have presumably benefitted most from the increase in territory and political prestige and 
power.  James attempted to change a deeply conservative country, and in doing so, he 
unleashed reactionary forces that felt threatened by the perceived loss of English regional 
dominance.  Consequently, they wrapped themselves in the defensive cloak of the 
common law and rejected for a generation the notion of themselves as British, despite 
having arguably the first British king in their country’s history.  When Conrad Russell 
argued that the Union of the Crowns failed to prompt the English to re-evaluate their 
notion of sovereignty, he was only half right.  It is true that the political leadership of 
James’ southern kingdom did not alter their thinking of the proper place of England 
within the countries of the British Isles.  Yet they inadvertently altered the bounds of 
Englishness, proffering parameters that shrank in scope while rejecting the option of 
equal partnership with the Scots.  In effect, they re-affirmed English superiority in the 
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British Isles.  Even when they had the opportunity to expand the practical borders of their 
country to the coastline of the whole of Britain, enough of the ruling elite at Westminster 
rejected the option thereby limiting the country’s political reach.  Concurrently, they 
ensured that Englishness pulled away from a more expansive Britishness, the former 
connoting conformity while the latter inclusion.  That is not to say that the concept of 
Britishness was born of a sense of ethnic and cultural diversity.  Rather, within the 
context of early modern Britain, the composite country that James envisaged would have 
meant that the English, Scots, and Welsh would have possessed a common citizenship, an 
arrangement the English would only accept on their terms.      
 In looking back at the union debate of the early seventeenth century, it is tempting 
to make sweeping assumptions about the opinions of the English people regarding 
Scotland, James VI and I, political union with their northern neighbour, and ultimately, 
their collective national identity.  Such conclusions are not necessarily possible with the 
evidence presented.  However, the loudest voices in the debate, both politically and 
culturally, proved the most influential.  Their opinions blocked the Anglo-Scottish union, 
and the evidence they left behind reveals a pattern – or train of thought – that underscores 
the conception of a Britain wherein England properly takes precedence over Wales and 
Scotland – and for that matter, Ireland – culturally and politically. 
 In the English imagination, territories that belonged to the Welsh and Scots 
functioned as self-evident extensions of English soil.  According to this line of thinking, 
it was incumbent upon the people who inhabited those lands to play by English rules.  
That was the English sense of Britishness.  It was Englishness writ large, and when James 
attempted to alter the English rulebook, they rejected his form of Britishness and 
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barricaded themselves into a national identity that appeared familiar, safe, and 
untarnished by a foreign king’s efforts to undermine the early sixteenth-century sense of 
Englishness.  In one of the great ironies of British history, when union with Scotland 
finally came into existence under Queen Anne in 1707, the English sought an even closer 
political arrangement than James VI and I had ever proposed.  As the political leaders of 
England and Scotland negotiated an Anglo-Scottish union in the first few years of the 
eighteenth century, members of the Irish parliament watched from Dublin, worrying that 
their country would miss the opportunities that they believed the Scots were on the cusp 
of gaining.5  It would seem that the unionist forces had finally won the day; however, 
even in the present day, the loudest voices in England still reject any union – and national 
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